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Legal and Policy Responses to the
Disappearing “Teacher Exception,” or
st
Copyright Ownership in the 21 Century
University
*

Elizabeth Townsend
INTRODUCTION
In recent years a number of law review articles and a
recent Harvard University Press publication have all sought to
tackle the question of academic ownership, with many of the
works titled something like, “Who owns academic work,” and
1
These articles reflect the
“Who owns course materials.”

* This article is published online at http://mipr.umn.edu.
Ph.D., European History, University of California, Los Angeles, 1998; J.D,
The University of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law, 2002; LL.M., The
University of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law, expected 2003. A
great number of people have helped me with this article, in their willingness
to answer questions and point me in different directions. Thank you to Dean
Toni Massaro, Alfred Yen, Kay Kavanagh, Sara Heitshu, Georgia Harper,
David Perry, Nick Goodman, Andrew Silverman, Graeme Austin, Erica
Rocush, SPARC, Jerrold E. Hogle, Sarita and Robert Townsend, Ron Gard,
Dalia Tsuk, David Gantz, and Laurence Serra, who began this whole long
journey with his innocent question of whether as an adjunct he owned the
materials he created for a law course.
1. One work in the last year that received a good deal of attention was
CORYNNE MCSHERRY, WHO OWNS ACADEMIC WORK: BATTLING FOR CONTROL
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2001).
McSherry’s argument seems to
discourage academics from using the law and court systems to protect their
work, demonizing those who do and accusing them of changing the tone of the
university into a space fearing litigation. She also suggests that academics
should not ask for anything more than what they are given, for fear of losing a
gift economy, safe from a commercialized space. McSherry’s subtitle, “Battling
for Control of Intellectual Property,” should have been “Surrendering Control.”
See id. (emphasis added). This essay was written in great part before
McSherry’s book was released, but in many ways can be seen as a response to
her positions. For other examples, see Georgia Holmes and Daniel A. Levin,
Who Owns Course Materials Prepared by a Teacher or Professor? The
Application of Copyright Law to Teaching Materials in the Internet Age, 2000
BYU EDUC. & L.J. 165, and Gregory Kent Laughlin, Who Owns the Copyright
to Faculty-Created Web Sites?: The Work-for-Hire Doctrine’s Applicability to
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uncertainty in just who does own academic work: the
university/school-employer or the scholar/teacher-creator. This
article seeks to add to this discussion in three specific ways:
first, by tracing the evolution of the disappearance of the
“teacher exception,” and arguing against the notion that the
1976 Copyright Act signaled its demise; second, by looking at
samples of what universities are currently constructing in their
intellectual property policies regarding copyright ownership;
and finally, by giving concrete suggestions to scholars who are
concerned about keeping creative control of their works.
The world of copyright ownership in the university is in
flux. This is a recent development. Before 1987, most believed
that scholars owned their creative works, even though they
were made for the classroom or during working hours. By
owning one’s creations under the “teacher exception,” a teacher
had freedom to use the works at other universities, make
alternations and new creations from the initial works, and
occasionally reap profit from publishing textbooks or, in rare
cases, monographs. Today, the growing trend is to see the
“teacher exception” as created not by judge-made law, but by
individual university policies. Universities decide what they
want to own and what they give back to the scholar/teachercreator. The motives behind the policies are often the potential
commercial profits of distance learning and other Internetrelated opportunities.
Commercialization permeates the university, from the
technology transfer offices that assist with licensing and
patents in the sciences, to the enormous energy put into the
commercial potential of sports, through broadcast rights,
corporate
sponsorship,
and
trademarked
university
merchandise. In recent years, the profit potential of distance
learning and other multimedia projects have sparked the
imagination of administrators and for-profit companies to mine
the copyrighted works produced in classrooms across the
university campus. But it is too easy simply to complain or
rejoice that the university has become more corporate- or
market- driven. We must first explore the context of this
increased commercialization in the university. For copyrighted
works, this means looking into changes in ownership and the
disappearance of the “teacher exception” in the 1990s. This
article focuses on academic copyrighted work – creations from

Internet Resources Created for Distance Learning and Traditional Classroom
Courses, 41 B.C. L. REV. 549 (2000).
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teaching, research, and writing – and how spaces of ownership
are changing in universities entering the twenty-first century.
Questions of copyright ownership, prior to the Internet,
were generally limited to discussions centering around the
unauthorized publication of lecture notes by third parties not
2
associated with the university. From this, courts historically
have given teachers ownership in lecture notes and other
copyrighted works in what has become known as the “teacher
exception.” Ownership gave teachers the autonomy needed for
academic freedom, the ability to produce materials without
interference regarding content, and the control to determine
when a work should be published—both in the subjective sense
as to when an author believes a work to be ready and the
objective sense as to the timing of all the stages that lead up to
constitute publication. Additionally, by owning the materials,
academics were also able to take established lectures and
deliver them to a new crowd of students when the academic
moved to a different university, either permanently or
temporarily. This notion of “teacher exception” has been called
into question in the last twenty years, in part because of the
new copyright law of 1976, and in part because of new
technologies that increased potential economic interest in
course content, scholarly writings, distance learning,
commercial note-taking ventures, and multimedia and software
projects.
Part I introduces the reader to the changing nature of the
university as a commercialized environment, looking in
particular at the development of profits for the university from
patents and licensing in the university. Parts II, III, and IV
form the core of the paper, which looks at how this new
corporate culture is transforming copyrighted works
throughout the university. Part II explains the basics of
copyright and ownership of copyrighted materials in order to
better understand the nature of the current struggles at hand.
Part III traces the debates over and changes in the 1976
Copyright Law and relevant case law, and gives an explanation
for the noticeable omission of the “teacher exception” in the
1976 Copyright Act. Part IV reviews some of the responses in
the form of university policies around the country. Part V ends
with suggestions of ways in which students, scholars, teachers,
and other academics might approach their intellectual property

2. See infra Part IV.
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creations in this new environment.
I. THE SPACES OF COMMERCIALIZATION IN THE
UNIVERSITY
Commercialization in the universities has, until recently,
focused on the impact of the 1980 congressional legislation that
gave universities the ability to patent and license scientific
3
inventions and discoveries to outside corporate entities. Eyal
Press and Jennifer Washburn’s article, “The Kept University,”
4
provides a nice window into the current concerns. The article
begins with the illustration of a scientist, who peers into a
5
microsope. We see a cartoon-like representation of what the
6
scientist is viewing overlayed with a large dollar sign.
Washburn and Press describe the increasing prevalence of
corporate money throughout the university’s science
7
communities as well as its effect on the humanities. Through
anecdotal stories, Press and Washburn present some of the
8
most troubling developments in this area.
One example concerns Novartis, the Swiss pharmaceutical
company “and producer of genetically engineered crops,”
agreeing to fund $25 million of basic research at Berkeley’s
9
In return,
Department of Plant and Microbial Biology.
Novartis had first right to negotiate on one-third of the
department’s discoveries, even if the research was government10
funded. Moreover, Novartis was given two of the five seats on
11
the department’s research committee. The latter agreement,
12
according to Press and Washburn, was unprecedented,
sparking concerns over academic freedom and free exchange of
ideas. One scientist explained, “[t]his deal institutionalizes the

3. See David Bollier, The Enclosure of the Academic Commons,
ACADEME, Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 18.
4. Eyal Press and Jennifer Washburn, The Kept University, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Mar. 2000, at 39, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2000/03/press.htm [hereinafter Press and
Washburn]. Thank you to Kay Kavanagh, who put a copy of this in my
mailbox.
5. Id. at 39. The illustration is by Seymour Chwast.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 40.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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university’s relationship with one company, whose interest is
13
profit.”
Press and Washburn also note the increasingly
common situation where university scientists have stock
options and other incentives that might affect the impartiality
14
Furthermore, companies are
of their research results.
requiring scientists to keep research secret for longer than they
normally would, thereby stifling the community of sharing
15
traditionally created within the sciences in the universities.
Press and Washburn also cite studies finding that industrysponsored research produced more industry-beneficial
16
conclusions than research not funded by industry.
Most of the attention has been paid to profitable patents in
the university, as the Press and Washburn article
demonstrates.
However, fears abound as to where the
commercialization of the university will lead. Some, like
intellectual property professor James Boyle, fear that this
intense privatization of scientific research at the university
level will lead to “creators [being] prevented from creating,” as
the availability of material in the public domain drastically
17
diminishes. Others fear that the humanities will receive even
less funding and that departments will be cut because, in the
view of a market-economy, less profitable departments will be
18
For this
less viable as they provide little economic capital.
paper, however, the focus is not on these apocolyptic concerns,
but rather on the consequences or implications of this move
towards greater commercialization and its impact on our
understanding of the role of copyrighted materials within the
university.
The story of the transformation of the university into a
more commercialized environment often centers on the impact
of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, which first gave universities the

13. Id.
14. Id. at 41.
15. Id. at 41-42.
16. Id. at 42.
Mildred Cho, a senior research scholar at Stanford’s Center for
Biomedical Ethics. . .found [in his 1996 study published in the Annals
of Internal Medicine, March 1, 1996, at 485-489] that 98 percent of
papers based on industry-sponsored research reflected favorably on
the drugs examined, as compared with 79 percent of papers based on
research not funded by industry.
Id.
17. Id. at 48. There have been a great number of movements in this area,
for example by law professors James Boyle and Laurence Lessig.
18. Id. at 51.
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ability to own patents on projects funded by government
19
research money.
However, in the United States, an event
over a hundred years earlier changed the trajectory of the
elitist European-based model of the university to one more
focused on commerce and industry. The Morrill Act of 1862
created land-grant universities whose missions became not only
20
teaching and research, but also public service. In part, public
service was seen as developing research that could help
strengthen the United States as an agricultural and industrial
power: “The classical view of knowledge for knowledge’s sake
was supplanted by the public-service mission of ‘knowledge for
21
use.’” Currently, there are 105 land-grant institutions in the
22
United States, with 29 tribal colleges.
In the intervening
years since the Morrill Act’s initial passage in 1862, additional
23
programs have been added to support higher learning.
However, the impact of the connection between the university
and industry/agriculture went far beyond the land-grant
institutions and helped to frame the concept of the role of the
24
modern university in the United States.

19. The Patent and Trademark Law Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517
(1980). See also Council on Governmental Relations, THE BAYH-DOLE ACT, at
http://www.ucop.edu/ott/bayh.html (last visited September 15, 2002).
20. Steven Andersen , IP 101 Research Partners Face Culture Clash,
CORPORATE LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 1999, at 2. For the text of the Morrill Act see
National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges, First
Morrill Act, at
http://www.nasulgc.org/publications/Land_Grant/LandMorrill.htm (last visited
September 15, 2002).
21. Anderson, supra note 20, at 1. For a brief history on land-grant
colleges and universities, see National Association of State Universities and
Land-Grant Colleges, The Land-Grant Tradition, at
http://www.nasulgc.org/publications/Land_Grant/Land_Grant_Main.htm (last
visited September 15, 2002). A bibliography on the Land-Grant tradition is
provided at
http://www.nasulgc.org/publications/Land_Grant/Further_Reading.htm.
22. National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges,
The 105 Land-Grant Colleges and Universities, at
http://www.nasulgc.org/publications/Land_Grant/Schools.htm, (last visited
September 15, 2002).
23. See, e.g., National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant
Colleges, A Chronology of Federal Legislation Affecting Public Higher
Education at
http://www.nasulgc.org/publications/Land_Grant/Chronology.htm (last visited,
September 15, 2002) (listing various pieces of federal legislation concerning
higher education between 1787 and 1994).
24. The problems confronting the modern university are not limited to
land-grant or even U.S. institutions. See Richard Poydner, Ownership Tussle
in Ivory Towers, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), September 9, 2002, Inside Track
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In order to further encourage universities to forge ties to
industry and business, Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act in
1980, which allowed universities to obtain patents created with
25
federally-funded research. In prepared testimony before the
House Committee on Science, Fawwaz T. Ulaby, Vice President
of Research at the University of Michigan, proudly reported
that the economic boom of the 1990s was in great part due to
this new development, as universities and corporations
26
collaborated to create new commerce and economic prosperity.
The Bayh-Dole Act transformed the sciences in the universities
and has created new pockets of wealth for universities, with
27
technology transfer offices in universities becoming centers of
28
significant activity. For instance, the University of California

Law & Business, at 16 (“A dispute over intellectual property rights (IPR) at
the University of Cambridge has raised questions about academics’ legal
status and the increasing trend for universities to view themselves as
businesses.”). See also, Ross Anderson, Not Broken, Don’t Fix it, TIMES
HIGHER EDUCATION SUPPLEMENT, August 9, 2002 (“From 2003, patents,
copyrights and trade secrets will be controlled by [Cambridge] university
bureaucrats rather than us. Behind the change lurks the Department of
Trade and Industry.”).
25. Council on Governmental Relations, supra note 19. See also GAO
finds poor record keeping on federally aided inventions, FEDERAL TECHNOLOGY
REPORT, August 26, 1999, at 4. Two laws in addition to the Bayh-Dole Act
created this environment: the Stevenson-Wydler Innovation Act of 1980 and
one of its amendments, the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 (FTTA),
both of which focus on government laboratories. See Prepared statement of
Maria C. Friere, Ph.D., Director, National Institute of Health Office of
Technology Transfer, before the Senate Appropriations Committee
Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related
Agencies, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 12, 1999. Friere’s testimony gives a
concrete example of how technology transfer works between universities,
corporate America, and the United States government, which often partially
funds the research at the universities.
26. Friere, supra note 25. For a corporate view of the impact of the BayhDole Act, see Prepared Statement by Randolph J. Guschl, Director-Corporate
Technology Transfer, Dupont Before the House Science Subcommittee,
Committee on Technology, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, Mar 17, 1998.
27. Association of University Technical Managers, Defining Tech
Transfer, TEXAS BUSINESS REVIEW, June, 1998, at 4.
Technology transfer describes a formal transferring of new discoveries
and innovations resulting from scientific research conducted at
universities to the commercial sector . . . through patenting and
licensing new innovations. The major steps in this process include: 1)
disclosing innovations; 2) patenting the innovation concurrent with
publication of scientific research; and 3) licensing the rights to
innovations to industry for commercial development.
Id.
28. For the united university support of the Bayh-Dole Act, see University
Leaders Testify at Bayh-Dole Hearings, 5 (7) TECHNOLOGY ACCESS REPORT,
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(UC) took its existing central office for all of the universities of
Patent, Trademark, and Copyright, and transformed it after
29
the Bayh-Dole Act into the Office of Technology Transfer.
Individual campuses were then given the choice to create their
own technology transfer and licensing offices, with some
30
“provid[ing] management for commercializable software.”
Only in 1998 did a University of California Taskforce
contemplate the need once again for a Copyright Office, with
more sophisticated issues of ownership surrounding distance
31
learning and other market-driven projects. The significance
here is that it shows a shift from general management of
intellectual property, to a more intense focus on profit-making
entities, with copyright being seen as negligible to the point
that an office is not even necessary for the whole University of
California system. That the UC Taskforce was thinking in
1998 of creating a new copyright office is also telling of the
latest shift in commercial expectations; copyrightable materials
may be seen as more profitable in the future.
The numbers from technology transfer are impressive. The
Association of University Technology Managers estimates that
schools in the United States and Canada made $592 million
32
No longer are
from royalties and licenses in one year.
inventions and discoveries moving into the public domain
through open publication; universities and corporations are
capitalizing upon them before they can reach the public
33
As the Press and Washburn article points out as
domain.
well, this has raised questions as to the whole nature of science,
tenure, publications, research sharing, and other issues that
34
surround the now valuable work in the sciences.

May 1994.
29. University of California, “Institutional,” UNIVERSITYWIDE TASKFORCE
ON COPYRIGHT: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Oct. 1999), at 4 [hereinafter
UC Taskforce on Copyright].
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Brenda Warner Rotzoll, Inventive Colleges Raking, CHICAGO SUNTIMES, Mar. 6, 1998.
33. Richard R. Nelson explains the universities’ license to patent, 5(2)
MICRO: THE MICRO-ECONOMIC POLICY ANALYSIS BRANCH BULLETIN 12,
Summer 1998.
34. Press and Washburn, supra note 4. See also Bronislaus B. Kush,
Funding can blur line between research and business; Many institutions and
journals are worried about conflicts, TELEGRAM AND GAZETTE (Worcester, MA)
Apr. 6, 1998, at A6, Health Care Delivery (noting results of zinc lozenges as
helping to cure the common cold indicate that the researcher held stock in the
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In the midst of this great science-based boom, trademark
licensing of both sports and the university itself also took off,
and the race to commercialize universities is not limited to
those two arenas.
In the 1990s, both universities and
businesses saw new commercial potential for distance learning,
collaborating in their efforts. However, they soon found
themselves at odds over unauthorized commercial note-taking,
with universities using the law to protect themselves and their
monopoly on note-taking through state legislation, desist
35
letters, and litigation.
Already in 1998, David Noble wrote: “During the last two
decades campus commercialization centered upon the research
function of the universities, but it has now shifted to the core
36
instructional function, the heart and soul of academia.” This
is driven, in great part, by the potential profits universities
envision from online courses, but universities are also
protecting themselves against the loss of profits from
unauthorized commercial note-taking businesses. According to
Noble, this push is driven by technology industries and
corporations “looking for subsidized product development and a
potentially lucrative market for [instructional hardware and
software],” creating “a fundamental transformation of the
nature of academic work and the relationship between higher
37
educational institutions and their faculty employees.” Forprofit companies, who demand faculty to assign copyright as

company that made the zinc lozenges: “After the stock soared, the researcher
sold his shares and made $ 145,000.”).
35. A number of recent law review articles have specifically addressed
issues of distance learning including: Nicolas P. Terry, Bricks Plus Bytes: How
“Click-and-Brick” Will Define Legal Education Space, 46 VILL. L. REV. 95
(2001); Chanani Sandler, Comment: Copyright Ownership: A Fundamental of
Academic Freedom, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. & Tech. 231 (2001); Stephanie L. Seeley,
Note: Are Classroom Lectures Protected by Copyright Laws? The Case for
Professors’ Intellectual Property Rights, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 163 (2001);
James Ottavio Castagnera, Cory R. Fine and Anthony Belfiore, Protecting
Intellectual Capital in the New Century: Are Universities Prepared?, 2002
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 10 (June 2002); Michele J. Le Moal-Gray, Distance
Education and Intellectual Property: The Realities of Copyright Law and the
Culture of Higher Education, 16 TOURO L. REV. 981 (Spring 2000); and Jon
Garon, The Electronic Jungle: The Application of Intellectual Property Law to
Distance Education, 4 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 146 (Spring 2002).
36. David F. Noble, The Coming Battle over Online Instruction:
Confidential Agreements Between Universities and Private Companies Pose
Serious Challenge to Faculty Intellectual Property Rights, DIGITAL DIPLOMA
MILLS, Part II, Mar. 1998, at
http://www.communication.ucsd.edu/dl/ddm2.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2002).
37. Id.
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part of employment, are using a business model rather than
university tradition to run many online distance learning
38
projects.
After interviewing InterEd online education consultant,
Bob Tucker, reporter Joshua Green declared, “[t]his idea of
wresting academic control from the faculty is at the heart of
39
Green reported how “Tucker
many business models.”
convinced Arizona State University to build its online program
outside the reach of the faculty so it can be run like a business
and avoid ‘the enormous bureaucratic red tape’ that faculty
40
A myriad of universities
participation necessarily entails.”
now have online courses, including UCLA, New School of Social
Research, Arizona State University, and Columbia University,
41
to name just a few.
Universities are also trying to keep their star faculty from
appearing in competing online projects. Harvard law professor
Arthur Miller was told that he violated his employment
contract when he agreed to tape eleven lectures for the new
42
online Concord University of Law. It is a story that has made
the rounds, for Miller argued that his actions were comparable
43
He
to publishing a textbook, rather than teaching students.

38. Nobles’ two articles detail specific examples of university and forprofit connections in the online field, often at the faculty’s expense.
39. Joshua Green, Superstars Online, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Oct. 23,
2000, available at http://www.prospect.org/print/v11/22/green-j-3.html.
40. Id.
41. See Fathom, Course Providers, at
http://www.fathom.com/about/course_providers.jhtml (including courses from
Arizona State University, Columbia University, the BBC, Kaplan College,
New School Online University, Sports Business University, UCLA Extension,
University of British Columbia, University of San Diego, University of
Washington, Concord Law School, Syracuse University, University at Buffalo,
University of California Extension, Berkeley, University of Michigan-Flint,
American Film Institute, the British Library, The British Museum,
Cambridge University Press, London School of Economics, the Natural History
Museum, New York Public Library, RAND, the Science Museum, University of
Chicago, University of Michigan, Victoria & Albert Museum, and Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institution) (last visited Sept. 15, 2002). See also, The
University Alliance at http://www.universityalliance.com/, which includes
Jacksonville University, Regis University, Saint Leo University, University of
South Florida, Villanova University, and eArmyU (the U.S. Army) (last visited
Sept. 15, 2002).
42. See Chanani Sandler, Comment, Copyright Ownership: A
Fundamental of “Academic Freedom,” 12 ALB. L.J. SCI & TECH. 231, 232
(2001).
43. Erica B. Levy, Harvard Tightens Faculty Policy, HARVARD CRIMSON,
April 25, 2000, available at Lexis, University News library, University Wire
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explained that he also had participated in other visual
endeavors, including selling his own videotapes, hosting a
public television show, and appearing on Good Morning
America. Harvard did not agree, and changed its policies to
44
prohibit such online behavior without prior written approval.
According to Jon Garon, Professor of Law at Franklin
Pierce Law Center, some online companies have yet to make a
profit, even though places like Merrill Lynch “projects the U.S.
online market in higher education will surge to $7 billion, from
45
$1.2 billion, by 2003.” He believes that so far the producers
have been unable to successfully market to the general public,
and that “the lack of success at Fathom [a consolidator of online
courses from a myriad of universities, institutions and
46
museums] has been attributed to its expensive, long courses.”
He also predicts that online courses may find their market in
47
He
community college and corporate training courses.
explains, “Abstract course content provided by the British
Museum may be interesting, but Fathom has found no market
for such content. In contrast, the University of Phoenix has an
estimated 27,000 online enrollees for its highly focused,
48
practical classes.” Even so, Garon and others cite remarkable
numbers for universities that are getting into the distance
learning business. Garon believes 75% is a conservative
estimate of the proportion of two-year and four-year colleges
49
engaged in online courses. Another oft-quoted statistic is that
“in 2002, it is estimated that 2.2 million college students—15%
of all higher education students—will take distance learning

file.
44. Id.
45. See Garon, supra note 35, at 147 (citing Sarah Parkin, Adults Tap Into
Web for College Big Time, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Dec. 13, 2000, at 8).
46. Id. at 148. See supra note 41, for a list of Fathom participants.
47. Id.
48. Id. (citing Donald MacLeod, Higher Education: e for East End: Donald
MacLeod Finds a Global Consortium Offering London History as One of its
Short Courses Online, GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 19, 2002, at 15, and Jennifer
Medina, Despite School Closing, Online Colleges Beckon: Cyberspace Market
Expected to Grow, BOSTON GLOBE, August 5, 2001, at B9).
49. Id. at 147. See also Ashley Packard, Copyright or Copy Wrong: An
Analysis of University Claims to Faculty Work, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 275 (citing
U.S. Copyright Office, REPORT ON COPYRIGHT AND DIGITAL DISTANCE
EDUCATION 10, 19 (1999) (citing International Data Corp., Distance Learning
Takes Off, Fueled by Growth in Internet Access, (Press Release, Feb. 2, 1999)),
http://www.idc.com/Data/Consumer/content/CSB020999PR.htm) (This link is
no longer active.).
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courses.”
On the other side is university and faculty concern over the
unauthorized commercialization of faculty lecture notes, a
problem California considered serious enough to pass
legislation prohibiting unauthorized sale to commercial notetaking
companies
like
Versity.com,
Study24-7.com,
51
Studyaid.com, and StudentU.com. None of these sites were
still operating as of October 2002, perhaps because of the lack
52
of profitability or efforts like Yale’s cease and desist letters.
All three arenas of intellectual property—from patents in
the sciences, profits from trademarks on university
merchandise and sports, and from copyrights, the potential
markets for distance learning and other copyrighted works
from the classroom—are deeply impacting how the university
looks at intellectual property. The story is also more complex,
particularly with copyrighted works, on which the rest of this
article focuses. First, the laws governing copyright are giving
universities a new opportunity to claim ownership on
previously designated teacher-owned materials.
Second,
universities began drafting policies that took advantage of this
change, putting universities at greater advantage if there were
potential profits. The heart of this essay explores the evolution
of these changes, looking specifically at case law, legislative
history, and finally, current university intellectual property
policies. Before embarking on this journey, however, some
readers may need to understand a few copyright basics within
the university setting.


50. Packard, supra note 49.
51. Lecture Notes Will Protect Students from Illegitimate Services, DAILY
CALIFORNIAN, September 28, 2000, available from Lexis, University News
library, University Wire file; Sharon Jayson, Online Notes Debate; College
Lecturers Split over Propriety of Free, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, March
26, 2000 at B1 (“StudentU.com has 1,300 notetakers on more than 80
campuses. Study24-7.com claims a presence at more than 300 colleges and
universities through the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom.”)
52. Stephane L. Seeley, Note, Are Classroom Lectures Protected by
Copyright Laws? The Case for Professors’ Intellectual Property Rights, 51
SYRACUSE L.REV. 163, 165 (citing Ambika Kumar, Duke U: Universities Fight
Online Notes Phenomenon, THE CHRONICLE (Duke University), Sept. 7, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 24492307).
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II. BASICS OF COPYRIGHT IN THE UNIVERSITY
SETTING
A. CREATING COPYRIGHTED WORKS
Copyright surrounds the activities of teachers and scholars
on an everyday basis. For example, a teacher creates a test for
a class. Is the test copyrightable, what makes it copyrightable,
and how does it become copyrightable? The answer depends on
a number of legal factors found in the 1976 US Copyright Act, a
federal statute passed by Congress and interpreted by case law.
Copyright gives the copyright holder exclusive rights to
reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute, perform,
display publicly, transfer ownership, license, or lend the
53
original work of authorship. For instance, only the copyright
holder of John Barthe’s novel The Sot-Weed Factor can
authorize someone to make new editions or translations, make
t-shirts with long quotes from The Sot-Weed Factor, or create
and perform a musical version based on the novel The Sot-Weed
54
Factor.
The Copyright Act protects the exclusive economic
55
interests of the copyright holder.
Copyrightable works for
teachers and scholars include lecture notes created for a course,
websites created for courses, exam questions, syllabi, drafts
and final versions of articles, dissertations, theses, and
monographs—all of the materials that scholars create and with
which teachers teach.
To be copyrightable, a work must have some modicum of
56
The
original creativity and be in a fixed, tangible form.
57
creativity threshold is low, but important.
For example, a

53. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106, Public Law 94-553, 90 Stat.
2541, as amended through July 1, 1999.
54. See JOHN BARTHE, THE SOT-WEED FACTOR (1967).
55. 17 U.S.C., § 106.
56. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (a).
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . .
Works of authorship include the following categories: (1) literary
works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3)
dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes
and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings;
and (8) architectural works.
Id.
57. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (a). The originality requirement is easy to meet,
requiring only “a slight amount [of originality to] suffice.” Feist Publ’ns, Inc.
v. Rural Tel. Servs. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).

222

MINNESOTA INTEL. PROPERTY REVIEW [Vol. 4:209

multiple choice or essay test would, in most circumstances,
meet the two requirements. However, if a teacher prepares an
answer sheet that has the student circle either the “T” or the
“F” for twenty-five questions, in all likelihood the answer sheet
would not be copyrightable, because two columns with “T” and
“F” in them would not meet the minimum qualifications for
58
creativity or originality. The policy behind this makes sense:
if one teacher owned the copyright on that type of answer
sheet, that one teacher could prevent everyone else from using
that form, because having a copyright allows the owner to
control the reproduction and distribution of the work, the
creation of derivative works, the distribution of copies, and the
59
public performance of the work. A copyright does not protect
the ideas within a work, but protects the expression of the
work, a distinction commonly known as the idea-expression
dichotomy. In an essay test, the phrasing and language—the
art of creation—is protected; the facts and ideas expressed are
60
not. Someone else could read the test, and use the same main
ideas for another test without infringing. It is when the
expression of those ideas begin to resemble too closely the
original that infringement occurs.
Lectures can pose a problem regarding the “fixed”
61
Lectures have traditionally been
requirement in copyright.
given before a live audience. To copyright a lecture, the lecture
62
must be in a tangible, fixed form. If a professor writes her
lecture in a word processing program, or creates an outline or
notes, those written versions of the lecture are protected by
63
64
copyright. Audio or video recording could also fix the lecture.
If a professor authorizes students to tape-record their lectures,
the tape recording fixes the lecture sufficiently to establish
65
However, the permission in
copyright on the live version.

58. Id.
59. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
60. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”).
61. Interestingly, courts (pre-1976 Copyright Act) had given ownership of
lectures to the lecturer (apart from the fixed in a tangible form requirement).
62. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (a).
63. These lecture notes, as unpublished works, are still protected by
statutory copyright. The copyright begins from the moment of creation and
lasts for the life of the author plus seventy years.
64. Id., see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6).
65. Interestingly, it was with lectures that the issue of whether teachers
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making the copy does not transfer any kind of ownership rights
66
in the copyright to the student.
The rights to reproduce,
distribute, and publicly perform that lecture elsewhere remain
67
The student has ownership of the tape
with the professor.
itself, not the legal intellectual property rights surrounding the
68
content on the tape. Issues of ownership in lecture came into
focus early in legal history when someone in the audience tried
to publish notes from the lecture. As this article will show,
courts have given the right to control lecture and professionally
created lecture notes to the professor, not the university;
however, the 1976 Copyright Act and subsequent case law are
69
quickly eroding long-established traditions.
The question here is one of control. Traditionally, scholars
and teachers have had ownership—or control—over materials
70
With a shift in ownership to the university,
they create.
however, scholars and teachers will no longer control their
creative product, which is bound to affect the nature of the
profession. One can quickly see that works not economically
valuable in an analog, live-classroom world may have great
economic value in a digital age. In particular, the game may
become entirely different when the classroom is transformed in
a digital age. Does the teacher own the materials prepared for

own their materials began. The question was whether a student or audience
member could print the notes from the lecture; courts, in the past, have found
that the lecturer holds the copyright in the lecture, and not those jotting down
notes; see Williams v. Weisser, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542 (Cal. App. 1969).
66. See 17 U.S.C. § 202, “Ownership of a copyright . . . is distinct from
ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied.” One might
consider making a condition of taping the lecture the transfer of the tapes to
the instructor once the course is completed. Then the instructor would have a
copy of her lectures without much fuss and would establish copyright in the
lectures if the issue arose at a later time.
67. See 17 U.S.C. § 202, discussing ownership of copyright as distinct from
ownership of a material object.
68. Id.
69. Today, however, new areas are arising concerning lectures, where
third parties are marketing course notes. UCLA is one school that has filed
lawsuits to protect the lectures, calling into question, of course, whether
UCLA is claiming ownership in the lectures themselves. See Jonathan Alger,
Classroom Capitalism,
ACADEME, Jan.-Feb. 2000, available at
http://www.aaup.org/publications/Academe/00jf/JF00LgWa.htm. (last visited
Sept. 15, 2002). See also University of Texas, Ownership of Lectures:
Commercial
Notetaking
in
University
Courses,
available
at
http://utsystem.edu/ogc/intellectualproperty/lectures.htm (last visited Sept. 15,
2002) (claiming lecture materials are the property of faculty; therefore, the
university will not file infringement suits).
70. See infra Part II.B.
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the course, or does the university? Are the materials prepared
for teaching owned by the university as part of the employment
contract, or are they separate, creative creations of the
individual teacher?
Who profits from lecture notes,
transparencies, tests, and web sites?
However, one need not go to the digital age to confront
problems.
For example, there are thousands of adjunct
professors. What do they own? As they move nomadically from
university to university, what is theirs to use again, and what
must they leave behind at the university that hired them for
only one semester? What about a professor who moves to a
different university, or graduate students working as teaching
assistants, or part-time lecturers? It is all a question of who
owns the copyright, and the ideas about ownership are quickly
changing.
B. COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP BASICS
“No one sells or mortgages all the products of his brain
71
to his employer by the mere fact of employment.”
Public Affairs Assoc., Inc. v. Rickover, (D.D.C. 1959)
Ownership has become complicated in the university
realm. Previously, teachers owned their scholarly works as an
exception to the work-for-hire doctrine under the 1909
Copyright Act. This was judge-made law, rather than part of
the 1909 statute. To understand what the teacher exception
means today requires an understanding of the ownership
schemes available under the Copyright Act of 1976. Three
basic types of ownership exist: author as owner, employer as
owner under a work-for-hire doctrine, and employer as owner of
a commissioned work by an independent contractor. The
following will briefly explain the basics of all three.
Ownership of copyrighted works is sometimes separate
72
from authorship. Normally, the creator of the work is also the

71. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
5.03[B][1][b][i] (2002) (citing Pub. Affairs Assoc., Inc. v. Rickover, 177 F. Supp.
601, 604 (D.D.C. 1959), rev’d on other grounds, 284 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1960),
vacated for insufficient record, 369 U.S. 111 (1962)) (italics added).
72. Garon, supra note 35 at n.72.
The assignment of authorship is distinct from the assignment of the
copyright. Any author may transfer his or her copyright at any time,
but the assignment of copyright will be a narrower grant than the
assignment of authorship, because the author retains certain rights to
termination of a copyright assignment that are extinguished if the
work is made pursuant to a work for hire relationship.
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owner, giving the creator of the work all of the rights afforded a
73
copyright owner. Under the current copyright act, this means
that the copyrighted work is protected for seventy years past
74
If professors own their works under this
the author’s life.
scenario, the university has no claim of ownership.
Employers own the work if creation of the work falls under
75
the scope of employment. The Supreme Court, in Community
for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid (hereinafter CCNV v. Reid),
determined what constitutes employment for purposes of work76
This case is discussed later in this
for-hire requirements.
article. For now, it is sufficient to understand that most works
of full-time teachers and faculty fall under the work-for-hire
requirements. The 1976 Act did not codify this judge-made
“teacher exception” as part of the statute thus its survival
77
today is uncertain.
Finally, a work-for-hire can be commissioned from an
78
independent contractor. This, too, will be discussed in more
detail, but many activities in which teachers engage, including
creating instructional texts, translations, and supplemental
79
In both instances, specific
works, fall under this category.
requirements must be met before the exception will apply.
That a work is commissioned, or someone works at a job, does
not necessarily mean that the employer owns the work created.
III.UNRAVELING THE “TEACHER EXCEPTION”
Traditionally, case law and custom has dictated a “teacher
exception,” where scholars/teachers have owned the materials
they create, despite traditional work-for-hire doctrine under
which the employer would be considered the work’s creator.
This is well-trodden territory. Many law reviews have explored
the development of the teacher exception and its current

Id.
73. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000).
74. One strategy suggested is joint authorship, which gives each party the
rights associated with copyright. To be considered a work of joint authorship
all of the authors involved in the preparation and ownership, contributed to
the work “with the intention that their contributions be merged into
inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” 17. U.S.C. § 101.
75. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 71, § 5.03[A].
76. Cmty. For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 460 U.S. 730 (1989)
77. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 102.
78. See infra Part III.A.2 of this article, discussing Williams v. Weisser, 78
Cal. Rptr. 542 (Cal. 1969).
79. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
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demise. The teacher exception was established under the 1909
act by case law, but because the 1976 act did not incorporate it,
the “teacher exception” was subsumed by a work-for-hire
doctrine that the Supreme Court’s definition of employment in
CCVN v. Reid places teachers’ materials under the scope of
80
Thus the university-employers own their
employment.
81
original creative works.
No court has decided whether the
“teacher exception” survived Reid, but the Seventh Circuit in
Weinstein, decided two years before Reid, had already
transferred the “teacher exception” from a case-based judge82
made law to one dictated by university policy. The university
chose to claim or disclaim ownership in traditional materials
83
produced in teaching, research, and study. All of this is dealt
with in more detail below and is part of the argument
surrounding the demise of the “teacher exception.”
This section looks at the issue of the “teacher exception”
from a slightly different historical perspective by placing the
84
85
“teacher exception” cases of Williams, Weinstein, and Hayes
alongside the legislative testimony of scholars and their
concerns during the Copyright Act revisions during the 1960s
86
and 1970s. One of the main arguments for the disappearance
of the “teacher exception” was its non-incorporation into the
1976 Copyright Act, suggesting that Congress had not intended
the “teacher exception” to survive. This article argues, on the
contrary, that the “teacher exception” was so well established
that no one thought it was in danger under the 1976 Act. This
87
idea is supported in Judge Posner’s dicta opinion in Hayes,
delivered one year after the Weinstein court gave universities
power over the fate of the “teacher exception.” To date, no law
review article has actually explored Posner’s assertion within
the context of the copyright law revisions.

80. 460 U.S. at 730.
81. Numerous law review articles have pondered the implication of the
Supreme Court’s “teacher exception” in Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v.
Reid. Some have taken the position that the Court’s definition of employment
includes teachers and scholars, and therefore, subsumes the “teacher
exception.” Others follow tradition and have argued that, like the 1909 Act
(which defined work-for-hire with a factors test and then by case law), the
definition of employment excludes teachers. See generally supra note 52.
82. Weinstein v. Univ. of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1987).
83. This section will discuss Weinstein and related cases in detail.
84. Williams v. Weisser, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542 (Cal. 1969).
85. Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988).
86. See infra note 171.
87. See infra text accompanying notes 171-175.

2003]

DISAPPEARING TEACHER EXCEPTION

227

A. THE CASE AGAINST THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE “TEACHER
EXCEPTION.”
The revision of the Copyright Act did not happen
overnight. Revisions were introduced in Congress as early as
88
1924. It would not be until 1955 that the revision process was
89
begun seriously, heating up from 1961 to 1964.
Draft
copyright bills were introduced in 1964, 1967, 1969, 1971, 1973,
90
Finally, after a hearing with over a hundred
and 1974.
witnesses in 1975 and more revisions, the 1976 Copyright Act
91
was passed by a 97-0 Senate vote on February 19, 1976. The
following parts of this article examine the “teacher exception”
during this time.
1. The 1967 Senate Hearing on the Copyright Law Revision
In light of the proposed revisions in the 1960s, the Ad Hoc
Committee of Educational Institutions and Organizations on
Copyright Law Revision was formed. It consisted of 34
associations
representing
educational
interests
from
elementary through higher education, public, private, and
92
parochial schools. On March 16, 1967, nine witnesses from
this committee appeared before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee
on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Committee of
the Judiciary to express their concerns about the proposed
93
They
Copyright Law Revisions currently being debated.
detailed, through written and oral statements, and question
and answer sessions with the senators, the main concerns of
94
educators. The “teacher exception” regarding ownership was
not mentioned. The best explanation of why it was not
mentioned is that none of the testifying witnesses believed the
exception was at issue. The support for this supposition is
circumstantial, but important. Witnesses detailed a myriad of
educators’ concerns regarding the revision and the fact that the
“teacher exception” was not part of this list is evidence that it

88. 8 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
Appendix 4 (2002) (reprinting “The House Report on the Copyright Act of
1976” as corrected in 122 Cong. Rec. H 10727-8 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1976)).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Copyright Law Revision: Hearing on S. 597 Before the Subcomm. on
Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
90th Cong. 141, 151 (1967) (hereinafter Copyright Law Revision).
93. Id. at 141.
94. Id.
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was not at issue. The concerns of the day in 1967 shed some
light on why the “teacher exception” might not have been at
issue.
The ad hoc committee of educators, represented by the nine
witnesses, had been studying the proposed copyright revisions
for three years, and their concerns represented their
95
recommendations to the Senate on the currently proposed bill.
Many aspects of the Senate revisions were revolutionary. Some
testifying educators touched upon these revolutionary concepts
in their statements. New technologies like the photocopier
96
Substantive changes to the
drove some of their concerns.
copyright law itself presented other issues, including the
change in length of duration of copyright, and the development
97
of the statutory category of fair use.
According to Dr. Wigren, chairman of the ad hoc
committee, the latest bill contained marked improvements for
education, but changes were still needed, and level of concern
98
was still high. Dr. Wigren outlined “six fundamental needs of
education which must be protected in any revision of the
99
copyright law.” These needs reflected the educators’ response
to the proposed bill, rather than all copyright needs of
educators. Their concerns included:
(1) the need for teachers to make limited copies of copyright materials
for classroom use; (2) the need to have “fair use” extended to include
educational broadcasting and educational uses of computers; (3) the
need for reasonable certainty that a given use of copyrighted
materials is permissible; (4) the need for protection in the event
teachers and librarians innocently infringe the law; (5) the need to
meet future instructional requirements by utilizing the new
educational technology now being made available to schools; and (6)
100
the need to have ready access to materials.

What is striking about these needs is the focus on
educators as copyright users, rather than producers. None of
their concerns focused on ownership of materials created by
teachers. The far-reaching issues at hand included formulating
a statutory fair use doctrine and extending copyright durations.

95. Copyright Law Revision, supra note 92 at 142.
96. For more on historical development of copyright law and the influence
of technology, see generally PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM
GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 37 (1994) and more recently, Mark F.
Smith, Intellectual Property and the AAUP, ACADEME, Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 39.
97. See generally, Copyright Law Revision, supra note 92, at 152-54.
98. Id at 143.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 152-54.
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Regarding duration: under the proposed laws, materials that
had previously entered the public domain after twenty-eight
years because of non-renewal would now automatically be
101
This
protected for the life of the author plus seventy years.
would severely hamper educators’ use of materials previously
102
If educators were concerned about
considered abandoned.
duration and other similarly grave issues, it follows that if the
“teacher exception” had been in danger, it would have been
brought up as a seventh point. But it does not appear to have
been an issue at that time. Furthermore, the educator’s
requests, according to Senator McClellan, were “a pretty big
103
order.”
Even so, one can see that the language of their concerns
replicates the “teacher exception” in that they saw the role of
educators as special and unique:
We feel we must bring these matters to your concern, because
teachers do not use materials for their own private individual gain.
They use materials for the benefit of your children and the benefit of
the children of all of our citizens. We have a responsibility that we
cannot dismiss lightly in seeing to it that children have access to
communication of ideas in our society . . . . We want to reemphasize
again so that you can keep this uppermost in your mind that we are
stressing the public interest in our statement here. This is our point,
104
because we are in the business of serving the public.”

Dr. Lois Edinger, a former classroom teacher from North
Carolina, and then an associate professor of education at
University of North Carolina at Greensboro, reiterated the
special place of teachers in describing the function of the
National Education Association (NEA): “NEA has two primary
interests: the improvement of instruction in the Nation’s

101. Id. at 147.
102. Id.
103. Id at 163.
104. Id at 149. In his prepared statement, Dr. Wigren also quoted the label
under the Library of Congress’ display case containing a copy of the Gutenberg
Bible: “Through the invention of printing, it became possible for the
accumulated knowledge of the human race to become the common property of
every man who knew how to read—an immense forward step in the
emancipation of the human mind.” Id at 151. Dr. Wigren continued:
This sums up in a succinct way the point of view and concern which
our Ad Hoc Committee wishes to express to the Congress in regard to
revision of the copyright law. Our committee is speaking on behalf of
the public interest—the right of every man to share in the
accumulated knowledge of the human race, and the rights and
responsibilities of teachers to make the knowledge available in the
public interest.
Id.
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schools and the protection of the rights of teachers and their
welfare. Both of these interests are affected by any revision of
105
the copyright law.”
Two other pieces of historical material support this: the
development of the ad hoc committee itself, and its resolution
three years later:
Because education has a substantial interest in the copyright law, the
NEA through its division of audiovisual instructional service and its
national commission on professional rights and responsibilities, in
July 1963, called a national conference of representative of major
education organizations to discuss both the present copyright law and
the proposals which were being made for revision of the law; to
canvass education’s needs in a new copyright law; and to determine
what steps, if any, the profession should take to deal with the
106
situation.

A statement of their concern was adopted in July 1966 at
107
the NEA’s annual meeting in Miami Beach, Florida.
The
1967 list is said to represent these concerns. Dr. Edinger
explained to the Senate: “Let me simply say as a summary of
that resolution that there are two parallel sets of rights—the
rights of those who create materials, and the rights of
108
educators to use certain copyrighted materials in teaching.”
Note, that there is an implication that the materials being
created are those other than the educators’. That educators
might create economically valuable copyrighted materials was
109
not yet a concern.
110

2. The 1969 “Teacher Exception” Case of Williams v. Weisser

In the midst of continuing discussions on the revisions of
the copyright law, a California case concerning the
unauthorized commercial sale and distribution of notes taken
at a UCLA anthropology professor’s lectures wrestled with the
111
While the
issue of ownership and the “teacher exception.”
substantive matter of the case is often discussed in law review
articles, the point here is that the concept of the “teacher
exception” was decided in the courts while educators and

105. Id.
106. Id at 158 (statement of Dr. Lois Edinger, representing the classroom
teacher uses of copyrighted materials).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See e.g., Alger, supra note 69 (examining third party sales of
university lecture course notes).
110. Williams v. Weisser, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
111. Williams, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 543.
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legislators were debating the revisions.
The “teacher
exception” did not become a concern of educators even after the
112
Williams case.
In all probability, this is because the “teacher
exception” appeared to be decided case law after the Williams
case.
The Williams case concerned a for-profit company that
paid students to take lecture notes, which the company then
113
The court found that the
sold to students taking the class.
professor, rather than the university, had a common law
114
The court explained that a
copyright in his lectures.
professor was hired to teach a certain body of material—the
Renaissance or Shakespeare—rather than to present a certain,
115
dictated expression of that material. The court differentiated
“other products of the mind which an employee is hired to
116
“[I]n
create,” from the lectures conducted by a professor.
order to determine just what it is getting, the university would
have to find out the precise extent to which a professor’s
lectures have taken concrete shape when he first comes to
work,” which the court thought undesirable and most likely
117
impossible.
To get to this view, the Williams court cited a number of
118
leading English cases, among them Abernethy v. Hutchinson.
In that case, Dr. Abernethy delivered lectures based on his own
119
The
notes at St. Bartholomew’s Hospital in London.
120
defendant periodical, “The Lancet,” published the lectures.

112. See discussion infra Part III.A.3.
113. Williams, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 543.
114. Id. at 545. Under the 1909 Act, unpublished works had a common law
copyright; only upon publication did works come under the federal copyright
statute. That changed with the 1976 Copyright Act, where unpublished and
published works receive the same term of protection, seventy years after the
See also Consortium for Educational Technology for
author’s death.
University Systems, infra note 214 at 11.
115. Williams, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 546.
116. Id.
117. See id. at 546. The court declared that “rule[s] of law developed in one
context should not be blindly applied in another where it violates the intention
of the parties and creates undesirable consequences. University lectures are
sui generis.” Id. at 546-47. The court further stressed that “[a]bsent
compulsion by state or precedent, university lectures should not be blindly
thrown into the same legal hopper with valve designs, motion picture
background music, commercial drawings, . . . and treatises on the use of ozone
or on larceny and homicide.” Id. (internal cites omitted).
118. Id. at 547 (referring to 3 L.J. (ch.) 209 (1825)).
119. Id.
120. Id.
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In granting an injunction, Lord Eldon compared Dr.
121
Abernethy’s role at the hospital to that of a professor.
The
Williams court reasoned that since in “absence of positive
evidence to the contrary the [Abernethy court] assumed as a
matter of course that the copyright was with the lecturer and
not with the hospital,” the copyright would not belong to a
122
Lord Eldon had assumed that professors
university either.
had a common law copyright in their lectures, due to Sir
123
William Blackstone’s copyright in his Vinerian Lectures.
Now, if a professor be appointed, he is appointed for the purpose of
giving information to all the students who attend him, and it is his
duty to do that; but I have never yet heard that any body could
publish his lectures; nor can I conceive on what ground Sir William
Blackstone had the copyright in his [Vinerian Lectures] for twenty
years, if there had been such a right as that; we used to take notes at
his lectures; at Sir Robert Chamber’s lectures also the students used
to take notes; but it never was understood that those lectures could be
published;—and so with respect to any other lectures in the
university, it was the duty of certain persons to give those lectures
but it never was understood, that the lectures were capable of being
124
published by any of the persons who heard them.
125

The Williams court also looked at Caird v. Sime.
Defendant had published pamphlets of plaintiff professor’s
126
lectures based on notes taken at the lecture. “In law the case
turned on the question whether Caird had lost his common law
copyright because as a professor in a public university it was
his obligation ‘to receive into his class all comers having the
requisite qualification,’” thereby making his lectures
127
The Caird court dismissed this
“addressed to the public.”
argument and responded, as the Abernethy court had, that the
128
lectures were held in copyright by the professor.
As to cases in the United States, the Williams court
129
discussed Sherrill v. Grieves, where plaintiff professor at an
army officer’s school wrote a book in conjunction with the
course he was teaching to “fill the gap” of material he wanted

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Id. at n. 7 (quoting Abernethy, 3 L.J. at 215).
Id.
12 A. C. 326 (H.L. 1887).
Williams, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 548.
Id.
Id.
57 Wash. L.R. 286, 20 C.O. Bull. 675.
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130

the students to learn.
He gave permission to the school to
print a portion of the book before the complete book was
131
Defendants claimed that plaintiff professor’s book
published.
was a publication of the United States, and therefore in the
132
The Sherrill court found that the professor
public domain.
133
was employed to lecture, not to write a book.
The plaintiff at the time was employed to give instruction just as a
professor in an institution of learning is employed. The court does not
know of any authority holding that such a professor is obliged to
reduce his lectures to writing or if he does so that they become the
134
property of the institution employing him.

Just because the government used the book with
permission did not automatically transfer or assign the
135
copyright from the plaintiff professor to the institution.
Finally, the Williams court explained: “No reason has been
suggested why a university would want to retain ownership in
a professor’s expression. Such retention would be useless
except possibly . . . for making it difficult for the teacher to give
136
It would be
the same lectures, should he change jobs.”
difficult because, if the university owned the material, they
would also control it and its future uses, including prohibiting
its creator, the professor, from giving the same lecture
elsewhere.
3. The 1975 Congressional Hearings
Nearly ten years after the first hearings, in 1967, the
House of Representatives heard further testimony on the
137
Again, Dr. Harold Wigren and
Copyright Law revisions.
three others appeared, including Sheldon E. Steinbach, the
then current chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee of Education

130. Williams, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 548.
131. Id.
132. “No copyright may be claimed in a work written in a for-hire
relationship if the employer is the United States Government,” NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, supra note 71, § 5.03[A] at 5-11 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 105). Nimmer
notes a “broader construction of works for hire in suits against the U.S.
Government.” Id. n.7.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 549 (alteration in original) (quoting Sherrill, 20 C.O. Bull. 675).
135. See Id.
136. Id. at 546.
137. Copyright Law Revision, May 15, 1975: Hearing on H.R. 2223 Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 267 (1976).
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Organizations on Copyright Law Revision.
The committee
had now grown to thirty-nine organizations, “represent[ing] the
interests of teachers, professors, school and college
administrators, subject matter specialists, educational
broadcasters,
librarians,
and
indirectly,
students
139
themselves.” As in the 1967 Senate hearing, educators raised
their concerns, but again the “teacher exception” was never
mentioned. This time, both research and teaching were
emphasized: “each function is indispensable to and supportive
140
However, the fair use provisions in the most
of the other.”
141
recent bill were the main focus of concern.
4. The relationship of the 1909 Act to the 1976 Act
142

The “teacher exception” was devised under the 1909 Act,
143
and affirmed by the Williams case.
However, whether the
“teacher exception” survived the 1976 Act was questionable. In
working out the parameters of the work-for-hire doctrine, one
1984 case which has not received much attention, is useful. In
144
Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., the Second Circuit
stated, “[n]othing in the 1976 Act or its legislative history
indicates that Congress intended to dispense with [the
145
standards from the 1909 Act work-for-hire doctrine].”
Nimmer commented, “the Second Circuit concluded from
146
However,
legislative silence that no change was intended.”
“the Supreme Court rejected such reliance on legislative
147
silence,” explaining “Congress’ silence is just that—silence.”
What this means when applied to the “teacher exception” is
that silence can be taken for silence and need not indicate
exclusion under the new work-for-hire doctrine.

138. Id. at 268.
139. Id. (testimony of Sheldon E. Steinbach, staff counsel, American
Council on Education and Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee of Education
Organizations on Copyright Law Revision).
140. Id at 270.
141. Id.
142. See discussion supra Part III.
143. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
144. Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc.,738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1984).
145. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 71 § 5.03[B][1][a] n.37 at 5-17
(quoting Aldon, 738 F.2d at 552).
146. Id.
147. Id. (quoting Cmty. For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730,
749 (1989)).
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5. The mid-1980’s Seventh Circuit Pair of “Teacher Exception”
cases
Over a decade after the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act,
two cases from the Seventh Circuit took up the issue of the
“teacher exception.” One case dramatically altered it, while the
other reaffirmed the exception in dicta. Weinstein v. University
of Illinois and Hays v. Sony Corp. of America both discussed the
question of whether the “teacher exception” remained under
148
the new work-for-hire doctrine under the 1976 Copyright Act.
Since no “teacher exception” cases have been decided since
before Reid, which defined the scope of the work-for-hire
149
doctrine, these cases are important in understanding the
status of the “teacher exception” today.
The Weinstein case evaluated the 1976 Copyright Act
150
work-for-hire doctrine with regard to professors and teachers.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the policy behind
151
However, the court based its
the “teacher exception.”
reasoning on university policies (coupled with tradition) rather
152
Furthermore, the court seemed to hold open
than case law.
the possibility that universities could change their policies with
justification, and include scholars’ writings under the work-for153
The following year, the Hays case, in dicta,
hire doctrine.
seemed to reaffirm that a “teacher exception” exists, for all the
154
Whether
traditional reasons given under the 1909 case law.
this serves as a contrast or a clarification to Weinstein is not
clear from the opinions themselves, which are discussed in
detail below.
The Weinstein district court found that the university
owned an article because the document constituted a work-for155
156
the appellate court disagreed.
Three professors
hire;

148. Weinstein v. Univ. of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1987); and Hays v.
Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988).
149. See discussion supra Part II.B.
150. Weinstein, 811 F.2d at 1091.
151. Id. at 1094.
152. Id.
153. See id.
154. Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988).
155. Weinstein v. Univ. of Ill., 628 F. Supp. 862 (N.D. Ill. 1986). The
dispute centered around which author’s name should be listed first, with
th
Weinstein alleging denial of due process under the 14 Amendment. Id. The
district court dismissed the complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, concluding that the employer owned the
article as a “work-for-hire,” and therefore Weinstein had no standing to sue.
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involved in a university-funded program wrote the article about
157
the program’s results.
Judge Easterbrook wrote the opinion
for the panel, which included Judges Cudahy and Posner, and
explained that “[t]he copyright law gives an employer the full
rights in an employee’s ‘work for hire’ . . . unless a contract
provides otherwise. The statute is general enough to make
every academic article a ‘work for hire’ and therefore vest
158
The
exclusive control in universities rather than scholars.”
court noted that many academic institutions responded to the
Act “by adopting a policy defining ‘work for hire’ for purposes of
159
For example,
[their] employees, including [their] professors.”
the University of Illinois, the institution in question, includes
the following definition of a “work-for-hire” in each of its
professor’s employment contracts:
[A] professor retains the copyright unless the work falls into one of
three categories: 1) [t]he terms of a University agreement with an
external party require the University to hold or transfer ownership in
the copyrightable work, or 2) [w]orks expressly commissioned in
writing by the University, or 3) [w]orks created as a specific
160
requirement of employment or as an assigned University duty.

According to the appeals court, the district court found the
article to fall under the third category because the University
funded the program, and “because, as a clinical professor,
Weinstein was required to conduct and write about clinical
161
programs.” Easterbrook found this interpretation to “collide[]
with the role of the three categories as exceptions to a rule that
162
faculty members own the copyrights in their academic work.”
Easterbrook explained that universities require all of their
163
“When Dean
scholars to write as part of the tenure process.
Manasse told Weinstein to publish or perish, he was not
simultaneously claiming for the University a copyright on the
ground that the work had become a ‘requirement of duty’
164
within the meaning of [the third work-for-hire definition].”
Easterbrook exalted the practice that academics have held the

Id. at 865.
156. Weinstein v. Univ. of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1987).
157. Id. at 1092-93.
158. Id. at 1093-94.
159. Id at 1094.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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copyright to their scholarly works, averring “[w]hen Saul
Bellow, a professor at University of Chicago, writes a novel, he
165
may keep the royalties.”
Easterbrook further notes that this
practice is “a tradition the University’s policy purports to
retain. The tradition covers scholarly articles and other
166
As further evidence, Easterbrook
intellectual property.”
notes that the University never acted as if it owned the
copyright.
Weinstein did not need permission from the
University to publish the article, a requirement if the
167
University had indeed been the copyright holder.
Easterbrook’s last point is very interesting: a university’s claim
of ownership comes with additional responsibilities,
responsibilities most universities have yet to accommodate
with structural and financial support. It also speaks to the
168
control issue, suggesting that, in the coming years, groups
like the American Association of University Professors should
remain vocal in getting out the message that with ownership
comes control of determining content, dissemination, and
publication.
Easterbrook explained that the University’s claim on
copyright focused more on administrative duties, such as a
169
What is interesting is that
university committee report.
Easterbrook leaves the door open to changing tradition: “We do
not say that a broader reading is impossible, but such a reading
should be established by evidence about the deliberations
170
underlying the policy and the course of practice.”

165. Id.
166. Id. Easterbrook also cites Nimmer : “This has been the academic
tradition since copyright law began, see M. Nimmer, Copyright § 5.03[B][1][b]
(1978 ed.), a tradition the University’s policy purports to retain.” Id.
167. Id. at 1095.
168. See supra text accompanying note 70.
169. Weinstein, 811 F.2d at 1094.
170. Id. at 1094. Todd Borow points out that the Weinstein court relied on
the Ninth Circuit case May v. Morganelli-Heumann & Assoc., 618 F.2d 1363
(9th Cir. 1980). Todd A. Borow, Copyright Ownership of Scholarly Works
Created by University Faculty and Posted on School-Provided Web Pages, 7 U.
MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 149, 156 (1998). The court used May’s holding of
“incorporat[ing] professional custom into . . . disputed contract[s], by bringing
academic tradition into the copyright agreement.” Id. “In the case of May v.
Morganelli-Heumman & Associates, the Ninth Circuit stated that if a practice
is known to the parties or widely held, ‘the custom is an implied in fact term of
the contract’ between the parties.” Id at 156. Borow further notes:
The Weinstein court appears to have stretched the May holding,
because while May relied on custom in usage in the absence of any
specific mention of an agreement to that custom, Weinstein looked to
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The Hays case, decided a year after Weinstein, continued
the discussion. Two high school teachers sued Sony Corp. for
copying (in some places verbatim) the word processor operating
171
The
manual they as teachers wrote for their students.
172
teachers’ employer had given the manual to Sony.
Sony,
after copying and modifying the manual to suit their word
173
The court
processor, delivered it to the school district.
174
discussed the “work-for-hire” doctrine in dicta in the opinion.
The decision was written by Judge Posner, with Flaum and
175
In some ways, then, this case can
Easterbrook on the panel.
be seen as continuing the discussion begun the year before in
Weinstein.
Judge Posner explained that “[u]ntil 1976, the statutory
term ‘work made for hire’ was not defined, and some courts had
adopted a ‘teacher exception’ whereby academic writing was
176
Posner explained
presumed not to be work made for hire.”
that the “authority for this conclusion was in fact scanty . . . not
because the merit of the exception was doubted, but because, on
the contrary, virtually no one questioned that the academic
177
author was entitled to copyright his writings.”
He reiterated
the traditional reasons, that although academics use their
“employer’s paper, copier, secretarial staff, and (often)
computer facilities” as part of their employment, “[a] college or
university does not supervise its faculty in the preparation of
academic books and articles, and is poorly equipped to exploit
178
their writings, whether through publication or otherwise.”
He noted that he did not include in this category material that
a school directly requested a teacher to prepare, and then
179
directed other teachers to use.
What is interesting about his analysis is the fact that only

academic tradition in spite of a specific provision dealing with the
vesting of copyrights that contradicted the academic tradition.
Id. at 156-57 (citing Michael J. Luzman and Daniel S. Pupel, Jr., Weinstein v.
University of Illinois: The “Work-for-Hire” Doctrine and Procedural Due
Process for Nontenured Faculty, 15 J.C. & U.L. 369, 375 (1989).
171. Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 413 (7th Cir. 1988).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 416-17.
175. Id. at 413. Note: Easterbrook wrote the Weinstein opinion, with
Posner on the panel.
176. 847 F.2d at 416.
177. Id. (emphasis added).
178. Id.
179. See id.
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thirteen years after Posner’s assumptions that a college or
university is “poorly equipped to exploit their writings”, much
has changed, or is about to change. The rise of technology
transfer and trademark licensing offices within universities has
greatly changed this equation, yet to date they have not focused
on copyrighted works. Also note that in this exception, two
elements are required: the school must directly request the
teacher to prepare the material and the school must then direct
other teachers to use the materials.
Posner then directly addressed whether the 1976 act
abolished the “teacher exception,” as many had believed. He
did not believe it had, “for there is no discussion of the issue in
the legislative history, and no political or other reasons come to
mind as to why Congress might have wanted to abolish the
180
exception.” He continued:
[t]o a literalist of statutory interpretation, the conclusion that the Act
abolished the exception may seem inescapable. The argument would
be that academic writing, being within the scope of academic
employment, is work made for hire, per se; so, in the absence of an
express written and signed wavier of the academic employer’s rights,
181
the copyright in such writing must belong to the employer.

Posner explains this literalist reading would wreak havoc
182
“in the settled practices of academic institutions.” He thinks,
if forced to decide (which he is not, since this discussion is
dicta), that a reading of the statute in support of a “teacher
exception” could be found in the fact that a work-for-hire has to
183
be “prepared for the employer.” With regard to the Hays case
itself, Posner explains that high school teachers are not
required to publish as part of their job requirement and
therefore this work falls outside the scope of their employment,
“especially since, so far as appears, they prepared the manual
on their own initiative without direction or supervision by their
184
superiors.”
Easterbrook’s decision in Weinstein appears to stand as the
only voice on this topic, meaning that university policies control
whether a “teacher exception” exists. Since the Weinstein
decision, the focus has been on the employment contract and
185
It
intellectual property policy at the particular university.

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 417.
See id.
For a particularly good discussion of this see James B. Wadley &
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seems that only tradition and custom, remembered by the
university, keeps the teacher exception in place.
B. A RETURN TO OWNERSHIP OPTIONS
In 1989, CCNV v. Reid further delineated the definition of
186
“employee” in the case of work made for hire.
Some people
have interpreted Reid as stating that, in most cases, teacher’s
creative works fall under scope of employment, and therefore
187
many believe that the “teacher exception” no longer exists.
What is interesting is that there are some instances where
professors’ and/or graduate students’ work would not fit into
the scope of employment, and would, as in the Reid case, be the
property of the professor/student creator. Elements to consider
in evaluating whether a person is an “employee” include
benefits, the amount of control over the “manner and means of
creation,” the skills required, the right to assign additional
188
Many of the
projects, and tax treatment of the individual.
court’s reasons why the sculptor in Reid did not meet the workfor-hire requirements would apply to non-tenured faculty,
graduate students, and adjuncts as well:
Reid is a sculptor, a skilled occupation. Reid supplied his own tools.
He worked in his own studio in Baltimore, making daily supervision


JoLynn M. Brown, Working Between the Lines of Reid: Teachers, Copyrights,
Work-For-Hire and a New Washburn University Policy, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 385
(Spring, 1999).
186. 490 U.S. 730 (1989). To determine whether someone is an employee
for the purposes of determining ownership of the copyright, the Court
developed a three-step test. See Wadley & Brown, supra note 185, at 396.
First, does an employment relationship exist, with the critical element, from
cases following Reid, hinging on whether “the hiring party failed to extend
benefits or pay social security taxes,” two of the factors on a non-exhaustive
list developed by the Reid court. Id. These factors include skills required,
source of the instrumentalities and tools, location of the work, duration of the
relationship between the parties, whether the hiring party has the right to
assign additional projects to the hired party, extent of the hired party’s
discretion over when and how long to work, method of payment, hired party’s
role in hiring and paying assistants, whether the work is part of the regular
business of the hiring party, whether the hiring party is in business, provision
of employee benefits, and tax treatment of hired party. Reid, 490 U.S. at 75152. Then, one must determine whether the works were produced within the
scope of the employee’s employment, and if not, whether the work could fall
under and meet the requirements for the specially commissioned category of
works for hire. See Wadley & Brown, supra note 185, at 396-97.
187. See, e.g., Wadley & Brown, supra note 185.
188. See Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1992). For more on
the Aymes five factor test and its application in a university setting, see
Laughlin, supra note 1.
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of his activities from Washington practicably impossible. Reid was
retained for less than two months, a relatively short period of time.
During and after this time, CCNV had no right to assign additional
projects to Reid. . . . Reid had total discretion in hiring and paying
assistants. ‘Creating sculptures was hardly ‘regular business’ for
CCNV.’ Indeed, CCNV is not a business at all. Finally, CCNV did
not pay payroll or Social Security taxes, provide any employee
benefits, or contribute to unemployment insurance or workers’
189
compensation funds.

In many ways, adjuncts and some graduate students would
fall into this category as they are employed on short-term
contracts, often without benefits, using their own computers
190
It
and other “tools” (often not even being given an office).
may be that Reid has created a situation where full-time,
tenure-track professors are treated as employees, but adjuncts
and graduate students would be treated as independent
contractors rather than as employees for purposes of
determining ownership in copyrighted materials. However,
distinguishing between the status of employees does not seem
to be how the university policies distinguish ownership.
Instead, policies have tended to concentrate on a different set of
elements—the kind of material created and/or the amount of
resources contributed by the university. Both of these elements
are indicative of the potential commercial interests in
copyrighted works that the university is pursuing, or would at
least like the potential to pursue.
At this point, even Nimmer on Copyright is unsure of the
ownership of course materials produced by faculty under the
work-for-hire doctrine. The treatise states on one hand: “[I]f a
professor elects to reduce his lectures to writing, the professor
and not the institution employ ing [sic] him owns the copyright
191
In a footnote, however, after reviewing the
in such lectures.”
Sherrill, Williams, and Hays cases (but not discussing the
Weinstein case), and then turning to Reid, the treatise
concludes: “Given that universities typically do not dictate the
manner and means for a professor to reduce his lectures to
writing, . . . perhaps such works still fall outside the work-for192
hire doctrine even under the 1976 Act.” It is under the workfor-hire doctrine that many university policies (and the

189. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 752-53.
190. See Garon, supra note 35, at 151 (“Adjunct faculty generally will not
be employees under the Supreme Court’s test, because they are not regular
salaried employees receiving benefits.”).
191. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 71, § 5.03[B][1][b][i].
192. Id at n.94.
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Weinstein case) rely, coupled with employment contracts.
A third kind of ownership is when an author is
194
commissioned to create a particular work. To be considered a
work-for-hire, the commissioned work must fall under one of
nine enumerated categories, and both parties must put in
writing that the copyright has been assigned from the author to
195
Teaching and
the one that has commissioned the work.
scholarly work could fit under nearly every category, depending
on the work: 1) a contribution to a collective work; 2) a part of a
motion picture or other audiovisual work; 3) a translation; 4) a
supplementary work; 5) a compilation; 6) an instructional text;
196
7) a test; 8) answer material for a test; and 9) an atlas.
A teacher/scholar can therefore assign copyright to the
university/school. Under Copyright law, both the scholar and
the university must sign an agreement, “which includes the
197
Some question exists
appropriate transfer language.”
whether this requirement is met in cases where work-for-hire
does not apply and universities are relying on assignment
because the teacher/scholar is generally the only party signing
the employment contract with the assignment clause; the
198
university generally does not sign the employment contract.
Jon Garon, Professor of Law at Franklin Pierce Law
Center, suggests that ownership of adjunct works might
require assignment because their work would probably not
meet scope-of-employment requirements for work-for-hire
199
Another area that would require assignment is
ownership.
distance learning because tasks might fall outside the
traditional scope of employment.
C. THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE TEACHER EXCEPTION
“. . . the notion that a common law tradition survives,
despite the language of the [Copyright] statute, may be
undermined when the academic tradition that gave rise

193. See infra Part III.C.
194. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 71, § 5.03[B][2].
195. Id.
196. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2002).
197. See Garon, supra note 35, at 151.
198. Id.
199. Id. Garon suggests that adjuncts who teach at more than one
institution license their work to the university, rather than give an all-out
assignment of ownership. Id. Of course, adjuncts are the least powerful group
of academics, and the likelihood of an adjunct having bargaining power to
achieve these ends seems unlikely.
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to that tradition is itself transforming through the
200
growth of new teaching media.”
Jon Garon, Professor of Law, Franklin Pierce
Law Center
It appears now that only custom holds the “teacher
th
exception” in place, and even though only the 7 Circuit has
gone this far, universities have taken advantage of this new
space to obtain a firm hold on new commercial advantages.
Weinstein clearly made the “teacher exception” in a “work-for201
Hays, in dicta,
hire” context dependent on university policy.
tried to make the “teacher exception” more stable, by claiming
that the 1976 act had not abolished the “teacher exception.”
Posner left the door open, however, as did Easterbrook in
202
Weinstein, that a day might come when that will change.
A recent law review article by Georgia Holmes and Daniel
A. Levin entitled “Who Owns Course Materials Prepared by a
Teacher or Professor? The Application of Copyright Law to
Teaching Materials in the Internet Age,” concluded that the
“teacher exception” continues to exist, “at least in the absence
of an explicit agreement to the contrary between the institution
203
But many of the reasons that
and the faculty member.”
Holmes and Levin offer are no longer valid in a more
commercialized and digital environment, as this section will
discuss. Before leaving the “teacher exception” to look at how
intellectual property policies have shifted the discourse to one
of university ownership, consider the traditional reasons for the
“teacher exception,” and whether the justification for faculty
ownership can withstand the pressures of technological
changes. This section will use the conclusion of Holmes and
Levin as a starting place, although their ideas and reasons are
the traditional reasons for the “teacher exception,” found in
many sources, including case law.
Among the reasons Holmes and Levin believe the “teacher
exception” will survive is that lecture notes and other materials
have traditionally had no or limited commercial value, and
therefore institutions “would typically have no reason to want
204
Commercial
copyright ownership of such lecture notes.”

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 152 (italics added).
See Weinstein v. Univ. of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987).
See Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 416-17 (7th Cir. 1988).
See Holmes & Levin, supra note 1, at 186.
Id.
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advantages of distance learning and other new knowledgebased products are quickly altering that dynamic, and colleges
and universities are already adopting special distance learning
205
policies for ownership of lectures and other course materials.
Holmes and Levin give a second reason for the “teacher
exception.” As professors move from college to college, they
206
However, as
need to be able to transport their knowledge.
the university becomes more commercialized, knowledge is
commodified rather than individualized. The basis for the
argument that institutions did not need ownership was that
they had no reason to want the materials to be presented in a
particular expression. However, with the advent of digital
technologies and the sales of knowledge and expression, this
may no longer be the case. This is already occurring, as in the
case of the Harvard professor who decided to teach an online
course for another university, and Harvard sued to prevent
207
dilution of cultural capital (the idea of a Harvard professor).
While not using copyright infringement as a justification, the
example nevertheless points to the changing relationship of the
professor to the more commercialized world in which
universities find themselves.
Holmes and Levin’s third reason for the survival of the
“teacher exception,” again a traditional reason given in case
law, is that the institutions would have to know the content of
the professor’s lectures in order to qualify under the Reid
208
However, this is also antiquated. With fully wired
test.
classrooms all over the country, it would not be difficult for
those lectures to be videotaped or digitally recorded, creating a
fixed form of copyrightable expression, as well as serving as a
monitoring device to satisfy university ownership.
The fourth reason Holmes and Levin give is that a
professor’s lectures should be treated differently as “a unique
209
As to the fifth reason, Holmes
kind of intellectual product.”
and Levin cite the Posner idea that applying “work-for-hire” to
210
The system
the scholar would “wreak havoc” on the system.
is already in great flux, and more havoc is expected. The

205.
this.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

As would be expected, there are a myriad of people concerned with
See Holmes & Levin, supra note 1, at 186-87.
See Twigg, infra note 379.
See Holmes & Levin, supra note 1, at 187.
Id.
Id.
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commercialization of the university is already underway, and
with it, the change of standards, practices, and influences.
Capitalism creates its own traditions.
Holmes and Levin’s sixth reason, that “there is a lack of fit
between the policy of the work-for-hire doctrine and the
211
conditions of academic production,” may also have problems.
Technology transfer offices, for instance, believe that profit for
the individual professor and for his/her department is a great
incentive for academic production. The sciences have been
operating from this approach for many years; universities
initially own patents professors acquire.
What is missing from their list is an important concept
raised by Jon Garon, whose thoughts began this section. He
writes, “[t]he reasons for providing a teacher’s exception to the
work-for-hire doctrine flow primarily from the desire to provide
212
That
faculty sufficient autonomy from their employers.”
aspect has completely disappeared, as university policies now
dictate the ownership relationship between faculty and the
university. If the university has a stake at potential profit and
ownership, the university is more likely to take an interest in
content and subject matter of projects. The scenario most
feared by faculty is that eventually the university might begin
dictating or censoring work, all for the sake of profit from
ownership.
IV.NAVIGATING UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY POLICIES
This article has chronicled the commercial development in
the university setting, particularly in the areas of patent and
copyright. Then the article explained what items in the
university are copyrightable, and the potential options of
ownership under the 1976 Copyright Act. Next the article
argued that the “teacher exception,” which previously gave
ownership to teachers as an exception to the work-for-hire
doctrine, is now at the university’s discretion, despite the fact
that it had not been debated as part the copyright law
revisions. The reason for the lack of debate is that the “teacher
exception” was not at issue. As the Williams case in the midst
of the revisions indicated, and Judge Posner reaffirmed in
1987, the “teacher exception” was widely accepted, despite the

211. Id.
212. Garon, supra note 35, at 152.
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paucity of cases. The next section looks at how universities
have implemented their power to determine ownership, looking
specifically at a number of recent intellectual property policies.
This section looks at the current state of intellectual
property from a number of vantage points. First, the work
examines an innovative policy by the Consortium for
Educational Technology for University Systems that seeks to
unbundle copyright rights, claiming that ownership
determination is not necessary. Then, the section turns to two
more traditional policies, found at the University of Arizona
and University of Iowa, based on the work-for-hire provision.
Finally, it looks to Stanford University’s policy whose language
claims absolute ownership of faculty works. After viewing
these three policies, the work then looks to two groups
concerned with copyright policy in the university. One group
outside the university, the American Association of University
Professors; and the other, inside the university, the University
of California Copyright Taskforce. The section then turns to
two final university efforts to clarify copyright, one at Columbia
University, and the other at the University of Texas, Austin,
both of which show thoughtful consideration of the complex
issues and conflicting interests.
A. THE CONSORTIUM - UNBUNDLING RIGHTS - A NEW APPROACH
The Consortium for Educational Technology for University
Systems (CETUS) is one example of ways in which universities
are trying to work out intellectual property policies that
contend with new technology, the impact of commercialization
in
the
university,
and
the
place
of
the
213
Comprised of three of the largest
teacher/scholar/professor.
public institutions in the country, California State University
System, State University System of New York, and City
University of New York, CETUS put together a
pamphlet/discussion series, Ownership of New Works at the
University: Unbundling of Rights and the Pursuit of Higher
214
Education.
CETUS was formed in July 1995 to pool

213. See Consortium for Education Technology for University Systems,
What is CETUS, http://www.cetus.org/cetusfct.html (last visited September 2,
2002).
214. See Consortium for Educational Technology for University Systems,
OWNERSHIP OF NEW WORKS AT THE UNIVERSITY: UNBUNDLING OF RIGHTS AND
THE PURSUIT OF HIGHER EDUCATION, (1997), available at http://www.cetus.org
(last visited Jan. 25, 2002) [hereinafter OWNERSHIP OF NEW WORKS]. About
the CETUS’s policy on ownership, The University of California’s Taskforce on
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resources and ideas in order to determine various intellectual
property and other current technology-associated problems
confronting universities and colleges today.
The Consortium wants to create a circular, rather than
linear copyright relationship between the university and the
author/faculty, creating interdependence and “ongoing mutual
215
reinforcement of shared interests.” The cycle has six steps:
1.

the creative environment fosters work protected by copyright

2.

the works are protected by copyright ownership

3.

the benefits of authorship accrue to the creator/author

4.

appropriate benefits of ownership also accrue to the
institution

5.

the institution fosters a creative/scholarly environment

6.

the creative cycle can begin again

216

CETUS does not explicitly name the “teacher exception” to
the work-for-hire doctrine, but CETUS does discuss the
instability of the law. The pamphlet says:
Although the work-for-hire doctrine may be widely applied in the
commercial environment, statutes and court rulings do not make
clear whether creative or scholarly work by faculty members should
be treated as work-for-hire. The law also does not make clear
whether the work of research assistants, for example, would be work217
for-hire.

The pamphlet suggests that a contract can clarify the
uncertainty of law “or if the law produces an undesirable
218
result.”
CETUS looks at three factors to determine not only
copyright ownership, but also the allocation of rights: “1) the
creative initiate for the new work; 2) the control of its contents;
and 3) any extraordinary compensation or support provided by
219
The first factor, creative initiative, is to be
the university.”
presumed in favor of the author/faculty, with the burden placed
on the university to “state the rights it wishes to exercise in the

Copyright noted that “The policies proposed and adopted on ownership are
tailored to an institutional environment in which faculty are represented by
collective bargaining units, but the discussion is useful and relevant to UC.”
University of California, UNIVERSITYWIDE TASKFORCE ON COPYRIGHT:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (OCT. 1999), at *21, available at
http://www.ucop.edu/acadinit/copyright/reports/copyright-final.pdf (last visited
Jan. 25, 2002).
215. See OWNERSHIP OF NEW WORKS, supra note 214, at *7.
216. Id.
217. Id. at *9.
218. Id.
219. Id. at *17.
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language of prior agreements, if any, to be proposed before the
220
creative effort begins.”
This is interesting. The traditional
“teacher exception” applies, unless the university creates an
agreement that changes the relationship from the start.
Regarding the third factor, extraordinary compensation or
support, the pamphlet admits that funding alone will not
satisfy the work-for-hire doctrine and bring the employee’s
work within the scope of employment or an independent
contract. “Consequently, an ‘independent contractor’ may be
paid for work, but that person is not an employee and will
221
therefore probably be the copyright owner under the law.”
This is an important statement that admits that the
substantial or extraordinary use of materials may not
necessarily bring the copyrighted work under the work-for-hire
doctrine. Many policies today distinguish substantial use or
extraordinary use of materials as a reason for claiming
ownership.
CETUS also advocates unbundling traditional copyright.
Through standard licensing agreements, CETUS seeks to
identify the competing rights and interests of the professors
and the university to the copyrighted creative work and give
both sides assurances. For instance, the faculty/author would
be able to, without obtaining permission from the universityowner: reproduce the work in teaching and scholarship, use
portions of the work in compilations, make derivative works,
update the work, and use the work with a new employer. The
standard licensing language was written in 1995. If the text
were written today, it may not be so generous in its philosophy.
When the work is owned by the creator, the university might
want non-exclusive licenses to use the work within the
university system, and the right to control whether the
university’s name is placed on the work. What is strange is the
recognition that under the law, the owner controls all of these
determinations, and that without clear-cut ownership, none of
these allocations seem possible, even by contract. The other
question is why one side would want the other to have rights to
something they do not own. In the case of the universityowner, it appears that this is a way to keep the teacherexception in place (and not stir up too much animosity), while
actually owning and controlling the work.
These rules go toward the traditional arenas of faculty

220. Id. at *18.
221. Id. at *19.
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ownership; the pamphlet specifically makes clear that
administrative work by faculty are the property of the
institution, regardless of the factors test.
Nevertheless, in the spirit of ‘unbundling’ of rights we espouse here,
the university may own the copyright, but the professor(s) who
created it should have rights to use the content in other contexts,
particularly future projects of a similar nature, or to incorporate the
222
content into scholarly studies or instruction.

Through license agreements, reproduction, use, and control, the
copyrighted work is maximized for “the mutual benefit of
223
This
the . . . other members of the university community.”
seems strikingly similar to the view of a technology transfer
office, which handles the licensing of patents. In this scheme,
copyrights would be handled in a similar matter, with the
university helping to license copyrighted works. CETUS gives
the example of licensing particular rights to a publisher rather
than assigning all rights, as is traditionally done, thereby
allowing the retention of the rights to “reproduce and distribute
the work for educational and research purposes throughout at
least the home campus,” as well as the professor’s right to
224
develop derivative works.
As an example, CETUS acknowledges that while
departments may be asking faculty to create web sites, the
actual content is left up to the individual instructor: “The
extent to which an individual faculty member contributes to
the course materials will weigh in favor of the faculty member’s
225
CETUS also acknowledges that
ownership of copyright.”
while course syllabi are developed to be consistent with course
catalogue descriptions, the actual scope and content of a
226
particular course is usually left up to the faculty member.
Generally, if the materials are circulated only to the students
or university officials, the faculty member has retained
“complete control over creation, modification, and even access
to the materials. This level of control helps strengthen the
227
However, if a professor distributes the
professor’s rights.”
materials at a conference or puts the work on the Internet, then
the professor has far less control over the materials, because he
has “increased the opportunities for others to build upon those

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id. at *17.
Id. at *20.
Id.
Id. at *24.
Id.
Id. at *25.
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creative works.”
The control factor under this plan seems to
miss the point: publishing the materials on the Internet should
not change the outcome of the control factor test. If the
professor owns the copyright on her syllabus when she passes it
out to the class on the first day, she owns all of the bundle of
rights associated with copyright, including the right to
distribute, perform publicly, reproduce, and make derivative
works. Placing the work in a particular medium should not
alter or lessen a copyright owner’s rights; in fact, the objective
of copyright is to give incentive for “authors” to create and
distribute works for the public’s benefit and education, as
229
But
stated in the copyright clause in the U.S. Constitution.
like the University of Arizona policy that distinguishes works
by the form they take, the CETUS policy distinguishes works
based on what right from the copyright has been used – namely
distribution – to change the nature of the ownership in the
work itself.
Finally, with regard to traditional areas of scholarly
work—in this case journal articles—CETUS suggests that the
university does have “a strong interest in how the faculty
230
member chooses to manage the ownership of that copyright.”
There is an almost paternalistic tone, where CETUS explains
that professors assign copyright to publishers “leaving that
professor unable even to use his own work in future research
231
To
and teaching without permission from the publisher.”
combat that, the university “may assert a ‘shop right’ that
would require the professor to retain rights to use the article
for teaching and research by that professor and by all
232
colleagues at that university.”
CETUS is only one example of the innovations in
intellectual property (IP) policies that are being thought of
around the country, as universities, now in the driver’s seat,
navigate traditional notions of faculty ownership of their
works, which are increasingly collaborative works in digital
and electronic spaces, and the economic incentives that might
be derived from the creativity at the university.

228. Id.
229. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8: “Congress shall have the power . . . to
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times, to Authors and Inventors, the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”
230. See OWNERSHIP OF NEW WORKS, supra note 214, at *29.
231. Id.
232. Id.
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The National Education Association (NEA), for example,
seems to support dolling out rights to both universities and
faculty, particularly in relation to distance learning. Faculty
own their originally produced materials and are able to take all
materials they create with them, should they move to another
college, even if the materials are used in a courseware
233
The college owns the courseware product itself, and
product.
is free to use the materials. The faculty member has right of
first refusal to teach the course, and faculty share in the
revenue. The NEA sees this resolution as an example of
successful collective bargaining.
B. THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA
University of Arizona exemplifies a trend toward
universities encroaching on ownership rights in the electronic
arena, but so far maintaining a teacher exception on traditional
works in non-electronic form. The IP policy produced at the
Regents level provides a good example of a number of policies
across the country. Like many universities around the country,
University of Arizona, Arizona State University, and Northern
Arizona University are governed by one state Board of
234
In 1999, the Arizona Board of Regents adopted a
Regents.
new Intellectual Property Policy that blends traditional
“teacher exception” values with the Weinstein ideas that
collaboration falls under the ownership of the university. In
the new policy, an uncertain space of copyright ownership is
saved for new technology and economic gains of works created
in electronic spheres.
The new policy has been embroiled in controversy, in part
because of how the new policy was created. According to
Distinguished Professor and Chair of the Faculty Jerold E.
Hogle, the new policy was created without input from the
235
Instead,
Faculty Senate or any other faculty-centered group.
business and university attorneys created a policy that was

233. Cynthia Chmielewski, News: Rights Watch—Protecting Your
Intellectual Property Rights Online, NEA TodayOnline, available at
http://www.nea.org/neatoday/0010/rights.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2002).
Chmielewski works at the Office of General Counsel for the National
Education Association.
234. The official intellectual property policy of University of Arizona is
governed by 6-908 of Arizona Board of Regents Policy Manual (last revised
Sept. 1999).
235. Personal interview with Jerrold E. Hogle, Chair of the Faculty,
University of Arizona, (Apr. 19, 2001).
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adopted by the Board of Regents. The rationale Professor
Hogle gave for this was that going through the regular
channels of faculty committees would have taken too long, and
might have jeopardized business relations with the
236
Professor Hogle commented that the Faculty
university.
Senate should have been able to review the policy and make
recommendations, even if those recommendations were
ignored, as that is part of the Faculty Senate’s duties and
237
The policy itself does not appear radical. If
responsibilities.
anything, the policy remains vague regarding technology-based
faculty creations.
The policy boldly declares: “Federal and state law provide
for Board ownership of intellectual property created by
university employees . . . [t]his policy covers all forms of legally
238
recognized ‘Intellectual Property’. . . .” The Board, overseeing
the university, owns all university employee-created
239
In the case of copyright, the policy
intellectual property.
defines the scope of university ownership to include, but not be
limited to:
a) scholarly works (e.g. textbooks, class notes, research monographs
and articles, publications, instructional materials, and research
materials);
b) creative/artistic works (e.g. music, art, dance, architecture,
sculpture, poetry, fiction, and film);
c) copyrightable software (commercial as well as academic or
research);
d) other developing areas, including but not limited to multimedia
works, and various other forms of electronic communications,
including media used for distance learning; and
e) mask works.

240

Also included as part of the Board’s domain of intellectual
property are various forms of data: “All data are considered to

236. Id.
237. Id.
238. ARIZONA BOARD OF REGENTS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY
MANUAL, 6-908(B) [hereinafter ABOR].
239. See id. The purpose statement continues: “Each university may
patent, register, market, and license intellectual property using its own
resources or through one or more intellectual property management
organizations.” Id. The policy then discusses how net income will be divided.
“This policy provides universities the discretion to retain ownership in
intellectual property, or to enter into agreements with industry sponsors to
grant exclusive or non-exclusive licenses, or, when appropriate, to assign title
to intellectual property.” Id.
240. Id. at 6-908B(2).
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be subject to this policy, as intellectual property is often
present in data that are generated during research at the
university. Data shall include but not be limited to: a) lab
notes, results of analyses, etc.; b) research notes, research data
241
At first, this looks as if
reports and research notebooks, etc.”
the Regents have claimed ownership over all intellectual
property, including spaces traditionally occupied by the
“teacher exception,” including textbook, research notes, and
creative/artistic works. However, the policy exempts university
ownership of these works.
What the Regents do claim ownership to are sponsorsupported
projects,
university-assigned
projects,
and
242
Sponsor-supported include
university-assisted projects.
funds from non-university entities, generally for the science
243
University-assigned projects are defined
side of the campus.
as intellectual property “developed as a result of employee work
performed in the course and scope of employment,” which the
244
The policy defines “course and scope of
Board owns.
employment” to include “any activity that is listed or described
in the employee’s job description or is within the employee’s
field of employment, including research, instruction, or other
activities assigned to the employee that involve the creation of
245
The policy explicitly states that
Intellectual Property.”
“[c]opyrightable works . . . are considered to be works made for
hire under U.S. Copyright Law, with ownership vested in the
246
This seems to indicate the “teacher exception” has
Board.”
disappeared, since it explicitly names research and teaching
activities.
247
These
The third category is university-assisted projects.
projects are developed by university employees and “make
248
significant use of university resources.” The policy notes that
“the Board does not construe the use of office space, library
resources, personal workstations, or personal computers as
249
In this
constituting significant use of university resources.”

241. Id. at 6-908B(5).
242. Id. at 6-908C.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 6-908C(2).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 6-908C(3).
248. Id.
249. Id. Interestingly, in the interview with Professor Hogle, he did believe
that using these sorts of university materials constituted university-assisted
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way, the policy is following the traditional distinctions set out
in case law, and in particular, in the Seventh Circuit cases.
The policy goes on to describe more fully “significant use” as:
use of research funding, use of funding allocated by asynchronous or
distance learning programs, use of university-paid time within
employment period; assistance of support staff; use of
telecommunication services; use of university central computing
resources; use of instructional design or media production services;
access to and use of research equipment and facilities, or production
250
facilities.

In this way, the policy resembles the Consortium’s policy,
in that using additional resources or creating a collaborated
work awards ownership of the work to the university. The
difference is that the university claims ownership from the
outset, and now groups ownership into categories.
The fourth category is employee-excluded works.
[T]he Board releases to the creator all ownership of Intellectual
Property in the following categories of work, subject to contractual
rights of Sponsors:
a) traditional publications in academia, including scholarly
works, textbooks, and course notes
b) artistic works (music, dance, film, etc.)
c)

academic software (not for commercial application)

d) student works (the student owns his/her works, unless the
student is a university employee and the work is part of
his/her employment, or the student makes significant use of
university resources, or the student’s work is part of a
Sponsor-supported project. Student works are not subject to
revenue sharing described above.)
e) electronic publications, including on-line courses will be
251
reviewed on a case-by-case basis.

A number of things are interesting about this policy. First,
the Board has gone out of its way to assert its legal right to
ownership of all intellectual property. Second, the Board has
not used the “individual” versus “collaborative” distinction for
its policy. Instead, the Board asserts its rights on everything,
in all categories, and then provides exceptions.
As to the exceptions themselves, the wording in the first
exception is interesting: “traditional publications in academia.”
Does this mean it excludes non-traditional publication arenas,
such as internet or other new forms of publication? What they

projects, particularly when additional resources such as travel grants and
research assistants were included. Hogle interview supra note 235.
250. ABOR, supra note 238 at 6-908C(3).
251. Id. at 6-908C(4) (emphasis added).
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are releasing are traditional categories where the courts have
found professors to hold the copyright, that is, lecture notes,
(Williams, Abernethy, Caird) articles (Weinstein) and scholarly
works and textbooks (Sherril, Hayes). The second exception of
artistic works recalls the Weinstein opinion, in which Judge
Easterbrook wrote, “[w]hen Saul Bellows, a professor at
University of Chicago, writes a novel, he may keep the
252
royalties.”
The fifth exception, regarding electronic publications, is not
an exception, but a wait-and-see space. Unlike the Consortium
that gave ownership of web sites created on faculty’s own
initiative without additional compensation to faculty, the
Arizona Board of Regents policy leaves the ownership question
unanswered. While projects using university office equipment
and the library are not to be construed as university-assisted,
the universities have also claimed ownership to all intellectual
property. This implies that until a decision is made in favor of
the faculty, the university owns electronic publications, merely
because it is not within the traditional forms of academic
communication. The Board is maneuvering for the future,
waiting to see what happens, unwilling to give up ownership on
potentially lucrative electronic publications. Recall that the
policy reserves the rights of “on-line courses” for case-by-case
253
determination.
Nick Goodman of the University of Arizona Attorney’s
Office, said the University has been working on a policy that
254
In general, he said the policy
would set clear standards.
would address electronic publications, software, and other
digital creations (including websites). Currently, the line
between faculty and university ownership depends on the
resources used, consistent with the current ABOR IP policy.
He asserted that if there is any significant use of resources (the
multimedia lab, for instance) for the creation of work beyond

252. Weinstein v. Univ. of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing
M. Nimmer, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 5.03[B][1][b] (1978 ed.)).
253. ABOR, supra note 238 at 6-908C(4).
254. Personal interview with Nick Goodman, Intellectual Property
Attorney, University Attorney’s Office, University of Arizona, (Apr. 25, 2001).
I sat down and talked about the policy with Nick Goodman, who is from the
University Attorney’s office and one of the principal drafters of the policies.
He talked about the history of the drafting of the policy, and the meaning of
the IP policy in practical terms. He discussed the process of the drafting,
which included input from IP committees from each of the three universities,
and input from local businesses, particularly on the sponsor-patent type
projects. He said that the whole process took close to three years.
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the desktop computer and standard office staff, the university
will take an interest and claim ownership. However, as the
current Arizona Board of Regents IP policy indicates, even then
the claim of ownership has exceptions, including academic
software. Goodman explained that categories like these give
the university and faculty room to define software as academic
(therefore the university does not have an interest in it), and is
particularly useful when there is no commercial or economic
advantage to university ownership.
Another interesting aspect of the policy is that creators
“must disclose any intellectual property . . . in which the Board
255
An attorney in the
or Sponsor may have an interest.”
Technology Transfer Office said his office follows a “don’t ask,
don’t tell policy.” The university does not have the staff to
police copyright ownership at the university. Moreover, there
is still little economic incentive for such policing. At the
University of Arizona, however, a number of committees are
256
exploring distance learning and online class policies.
Universities have traditionally claimed ownership in materials,
257
but have not enforced their ownership rights.
C. THE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA
The University of Iowa summarizes the two approaches
presented above, recognizing these as the two major strands of
258
ownership theory.
The policy begins by quoting the
University of Iowa Operations Manual section laying out the
ownership parameters:
[e]xcept as provided in V-31-3, textbooks and other products of
teaching, research, scholarship, and artistic endeavors belong to the
faculty or staff member when the product is not the result of a specific
assignment or commission and where there is no substantial
University contribution or support beyond the salary, developmental
assignment, services, and facilities (including libraries and
laboratories) customarily provided to faculty in the respective
259
discipline and University unit.


255. ABOR, supra note 238 at 6-908D(1).
256. Hogle interview supra note 235; Interview with Andrew Silverman,
Joseph M. Livermore Professor of Law, University of Arizona, James E.
Rogers College of Law (Apr. 20, 2001).
257. Robert Gorman, Intellectual Property: The Rights of Faculty as
Creators and Users, ACADEME, May/June 1998, at 15.
258. University of Iowa, Faculty or University Ownership of Course
Materials, at http://twist.lib.uiowa.edu/resources/fairuse/ownership.html (last
visited Jan. 16, 2003).
259. Id. (emphasis added).
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If this statement does not make it clear that the University
of Iowa is not claiming ownership in course materials, the next
sentence makes it explicit: “[h]owever, other universities have
made claims of ownership of course-related materials developed
260
The University of Iowa also notes that CETUS
by faculty.”
“suggests that university ownership of intellectual property
does not have to be an ‘all-or-nothing proposition’ and that the
‘unbundling’ of intellectual property rights may best serve the
261
University of Iowa, therefore, is
university community.”
currently giving ownership to faculty in traditional materials
and in their course materials, but recognizing the possibilities
of what others are doing.
D. STANFORD UNIVERSITY
Stanford’s policy contains problems similar to those in
policies like the Arizona Regent’s policy. Their policy states:
“[i]n accord with academic tradition, except to the extent set
forth in this policy, Stanford does not claim ownership to
pedagogical, scholarly, or artistic works, regardless of their
262
form of expression.” Ownership of lecture and other teaching
materials is not addressed.
“The University claims no
ownership of popular nonfiction, novels, textbooks, poems,
musical compositions, unpatentable software, or other works of
artistic imagination which are not institutional works and did
not make significant use of University resources or the services
of University non-faculty employees working within the scope
263
Nor do lecture and course materials
of their employment.”
appear under the category of institutional works. The only
possible mention could be under the category of “Videotaping
and Related Classroom Technology,” the first line of which
reads: “[c]ourses taught and courseware developed for teaching
264
at Stanford belong to Stanford.” Scholars are also required to
sign a “Patent and Copyright Agreement for Stanford
Personnel,” which reads in part:
Stanford policy states that all rights in copyright shall remain with
the creator unless the work: (a) is a work-for-hire (and copyright
therefore vests in the University under copyright law), (b) is


260. Id.
261. Id. (quotes in original).
Copyright
Policy
(RPH
5.2),
262. Stanford
University,
at
http://www.stanford.edu/dept/DoR/rph/5-2.html. (last visited Jan. 16, 2003).
263. Id. Why the adjective “popular” is added to nonfiction is unclear,
especially since most scholarship does not become “popular.”
264. Id.
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supported by a direct allocation of funds through the University for
the pursuit of a specific project, (c) is commissioned by the University,
265
or (d) is otherwise subject to contractual obligations.

Why lecture materials, but not works of scholarship or
other nonfiction works would fall under the work-for-hire
exemption, is unclear.
E. THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS
The American Association of University Professors’
(AAUP) position on copyright came out of a Special Committee
266
on Distance Education established in June 1998.
A year
later, they released statements on distance learning and
267
This was the first intellectual property
copyright protection.
268
policy the AAUP produced since their 1915 foundation.
The
AAUP policy reflects the current debate and includes views of
269
different constituencies within the AAUP.
The AAUP began their Statement on Copyright with the
United States Constitution copyright clause’s objective “to
270
promote the progress of science and useful arts.” Institutions
of higher learning should interpret the clause and subsequent
copyright laws to “encourage the discovery of new knowledge
and its dissemination to students, to the profession and to the
271
While not naming the “teacher exception” as such,
public.”
the Copyright Statement explains that “it has been the
prevailing academic practice to treat faculty members as the
copyright owner [sic] of works that are created independently

265. Stanford University, Patent and Copyright Agreement for Stanford
Personnel, at http://www.stanford.edu/dept/DoR/rph/su18.html (last visited
Jan. 16, 2003).
266. AAUP, Committee R on Government Relationship; Report on Distance
Learning, at http://www.aaup.org/Issues/DistanceEd/Archives/dlreport.htm.
(last visited Sept. 1, 2002). See also, AAUP, Statement on Distance Education,
at http://www.aaup.org/statements/Redbook/StDistEd.HTM (last visited Jan.
16, 2003); AAUP, Statement on Copyright, at
http://www.aaup.org/statements/Redbook/Spccopyr.htm (last visited Jan. 16,
2003).
267. Id.
268. Mark F. Smith, Intellectual Property and the AAUP, 88 ACADEME,
Sept.–Oct. 2002, at 39.
269. Id. at 41. Included are the views of the “standing committees on
accreditation, government relations, and academic freedom, and the teaching
committee’s subcommittee on the use of technology in college and university
instruction . . . [and] the staff director of a collective bargaining chapter.” Id.
270. AAUP, Statement on Copyright, supra note 266.
271. Id. The Statement on Copyright cites the AAUP’s 1940 Statement of
Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure as reflecting this mission.
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and at the faculty member’s own initiative for traditional
272
academic purposes.”
This includes “class notes and syllabi,
books and articles, works of fiction and nonfiction, poems and
dramatic works, musical and choreographic works, pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works, and educational software,
273
This statement merged
commonly known as ‘courseware.’”
the property discussed in cases (class notes, articles, and
fiction) with the non-exclusive list of materials found in the
274
The Copyright Statement notes that
Copyright Act itself.
faculty ownership has traditionally disregarded the form of the
work; that is, whether the form is traditional, audiovisual, or
electronic, faculty members have historically been treated as
275
the owners of those copyrights.
The Copyright Statement explores three scenarios of
ownership in the university context. Some institutions have
handbooks that assign copyright from the faculty to the
university.
This is distinct from policies in which the
university initially owns the copyright. The AAUP statement
notes the initial faculty owner must assign over her rights in
276
writing to the university for the assignment to be legal.
The
writing requirement of a valid transfer is satisfied by a faculty
“condition of employment, [to] sign a faculty handbook which
purports to vest in the institution the ownership of all works
277
The
created by the faculty member for an indefinite future.”
assignment scenario could be initiated either because the
university fears the teacher is the original owner, or believes
the work may fall under the independent contractor’s
commissioned works categories of the Copyright Act.
One lawyer advocating the assignment approach (described
above in the AAUP’s Statement of Copyright) is Clark Shore,
Assistant General Attorney for the State of Washington, who
made a presentation at the Association of Research Library’s
278
Copyright and Leadership Workshop in the mid-1990s. Clark

272. Id.
273. Id.
274. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) protects “(1) literary works; (2) musical
works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any
accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual
works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works.”
275. AAUP, Statement on Copyright, supra note 266.
276. Id. See also 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2000).
277. AAUP, Statement on Copyright, supra note 266.
278. Clark Shore, “Ownership of Faculty Works and University Copyright
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Shore’s article, “Ownership of Faculty Works and University
Copyright Policies,” published in ALR, reflects the power
universities have through their policies to determine
279
According to Shore, the work-for-hire doctrine
ownership.
would not be well-received by faculty if the university suddenly
claimed ownership to all traditional and non-traditional forms
of writings. Instead, Shore advocated an employment contract
requiring assignment of copyright to the university “when the
determination has been made that the university has an
280
interest in the work.” The determination would be made and
policies implemented by a new administrative office: the
University Copyright Office. A threshold would be established
beyond which faculty would be required to report “any
281
If the
copyrightable work of potential commercial value.”
university became interested, the faculty and university would
enter into an agreement (if written assignment of copyright
was necessary), or the university would claim its rights under
the work-for-hire doctrine (if the work fell within that
framework). “In cases where the parties agree the work is not
a work for hire, a simple assignment of copyright interests will

Policy,” 189 ALR: A BIMONTHLY NEWSLETTER OF RESEARCH LIBRARY ISSUES
AND ACTIONS 2 (Dec. 1996) available at
http://www.alr.org/newsltr/189/owner.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2003. Shore
presented a more extended version of this paper at the ALR Copyright and
Leadership Workshop in Seattle, Washington. He argued that:
[a] university policy concerning copyright interests in faculty works
should address at least the following issues: (1) whether the
university will assert an ownership interest in some faculty works,
and, if so, which ones; (2) the means by which the university will
obtain an ownership interest in those faculty works not considered
works for hire; and (3) the process by which determinations of
institutional interest will be made.
Id.
Shore noted that the class approach reduces the burden on the
administration making individual determinations. See id. Shore explained
that the general factors approach, used at many universities, involves five
factors:
(1) the extent to which institutional resources were used in preparing
the work; (2) the commercial character of the work; (3) the utilitarian
(as opposed to purely scholarly or aesthetic) character of the work; (4)
the connection between the work and the faculty member’s job
responsibilities; (5) the concern to avoid disputes within the
university community.
Id. Shore noted that these considerations parallel the statutory balancing test
of the fair use doctrine. See id.
279. Id.
280. AAUP, Statement on Copyright, supra note 266.
281. Id.
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282

suffice.”
Three things come to mind. First, there is no
indication that the university is doing anything to receive this
assignment, even registering the copyright. Second, this policy
would encourage faculty not to pursue commercial projects so
as to have no interference from the university. Third, by
assigning rights to the university, the faculty member no
longer controls the elements of copyright she might deem
important: making derivative works, controlling publication,
etc.—all of the rights connected to a copyrighted work that the
AAUP are concerned in protecting.
Returning to the AAUP’s ownership categories, the “workfor-hire” scenario makes the institution the initial owner. The
Copyright Statement focuses on defining the concept of “scope
of employment”—a key component in determining whether the
283
The Copyright
work is the legal property of the employer.
Statement first reiterates the traditional elements of the scope
284
of employment, as described in Reid, including the content of
the work being under the direction, control, design and
285
The committee contrasted this
supervision of the employer.
with academic work explaining, “[i]n the case of traditional
academic works, however, the faculty member, rather than the
institution determines the subject matter, the intellectual
approach and the direction, and the conclusions, . . . the very
286
The committee also explained
essence of academic freedom.”
the danger in an institution owning the materials because:
[The institution] would have the powers, for example, to decide where
the work is to be published, to edit and otherwise revise it, to prepare
derivative works based thereon (such as translations, abridgements,
and literary, musical, or artistic variations), and indeed to censor and
forbid dissemination of the work altogether. Such powers, so deeply
inconsistent with fundamental principles of academic freedom, cannot
287
rest with the institution.

These are now familiar arguments. Corynne McSherry, in
288
her recently published work, Who Owns Academic Work,
seems to have missed this point entirely, though she quotes the
same material. McSherry appears to not understand why a
policy that determined electronic ownership on a case-by-case

282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Id.
Id.
Cmty. For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
AAUP, Statement on Copyright, supra note 266.
Id.
Id.
McSherry, supra note 1, at 102.
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basis would be objectionable to faculty. McSherry begins by
relating the experience of a draft report on copyright prepared
289
by the “University of the West” being circulated in September
1998—only four months after the AAUP’s statement.
McSherry writes that the report contained “a set of fairly
noncontroversial recommendations,” which were objectionable
“from faculty associations, technology transfer managers, and
research administrators,” with the criticism “going so far as to
suggest that the committee was too responsive to the
administration and insufficiently committed to scholarship,
290
According to McSherry,
creativity, and academic freedom.”
the committee failed to define ownership of copyright materials
as a stable category a failure also present in the Regents of
Arizona policy.
Under the Regents of Arizona’s policy,
ownership (on a work-for-hire basis) on electronic forms of
academic work would be decided on a case-by-case basis. At
the University of the West, according to McSherry, “class
materials and lectures might not always fall into the category
of ‘works of scholarship,’”—the category of faculty-owned
291
material.
While McSherry admits that these sites of conflict are
increasing, with “faculty copyrights . . . being construed as
badges of autonomy, independence, and control,” she quickly
explains that “University administrators across the country . . .
are observing the institutional investment and profit potential
in Internet-based education tools and software developed by
faculty and students under university auspices, and are
themselves moving to assert copyright ownership of some
292
Profit drives the policy, riding the
teaching materials.”
argument that libraries need money for increased journal
prices. McSherry admits that faculty are suspicious of the new
relationships between universities and for-profit “learning
293
and takes the argument to the realm of
corporations,”
commodification: “activists warn faculty that they must
carefully guard their copyrights if they wish to stave off
commodification of education and the proletarianization of the

289. Id. (giving no citation to the draft and disguises the University of
California with a fictional name, University of the West).
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 103.
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professoriate.”
Still no mention for the concerns the AAUP
noted – that by placing ownership in the hands of the
university, academic freedom and the nature of the profession
is at risk. Instead, McSherry believes that faculty want to be
seen as “arbiters of true and valuable knowledge . . . [a position
that] depends on the location of academia outside the realm of
commodity production and circulation,” and she sees a conflict
in faculty owning their own works, because they are part of the
commodified system. She does not acknowledge that someone
owns the material, and with ownership comes control to create
and disseminate ideas.
McSherry does not explain why faculty should be treated
as knowledge owners rather than as knowledge workers,
believing that faculty are only interested in ownership to keep
their “monopoly of competence” in “cognitive property” in order
to “control a market for their expertise,” and fear that their
positions would be “downgrade[d] to that of an ordinary staff
295
member.” Finally, in response to the AAUP’s concerns over a
“work-for-hire” doctrine being applied to faculty work, and their
fear that “such powers [are] deeply inconsistent with the
296
McSherry
fundamental principles of academic freedom . . . .”
responds: “[b]ut if there is something offensive about an
institution controlling the dissemination of a work (including,
by implication, its commercialization), it is not clear that there
is anything inherently less offensive about an individual
297
She bases this opinion on her
professor being able to do so.”
belief that “professors are supposed to be producing gifts, not
commodities,
and
scholarship
is
supposed
to
be
298
However, professors live in a market
‘disinterested.’”
economy, where their works are commodities, and as the last
thirty years of cultural and literary theory have shown,
scholarship can never come from a disinterested space.
The AAUP’s Statement on Copyright continues, explaining
there are some instances, as in the Arizona Regents policy,
where the university does have a legitimate claim in
ownership. These are works where the university “provides the
specific authorization or supervision of the preparation of the
work,” with examples like “reports prepared by a dean or by the

294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

Id.
Id. at 108-9.
Id. at 110 (quoting AAUP, Statement on Copyright).
Id.
Id.
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chair or members of a faculty committee, or college promotional
299
brochures prepared by a director of admissions.”
The AAUP also sees a fourth type of ownership, situations
where joint authorship between the university and the faculty
member may be appropriate, where both share the copyright.
“New instructional technologies” is a particular place this
might apply, with content from faculty and technology from the
300
The question of joint authorship qualifications
university.
under the copyright law, however, requires that each author
301
In some scenarios the university’s
contribute creatively.
302
involvement will not rise to “authorship.”
The statement
explains:
On the one hand, the institution may simply supply “delivery
mechanisms,” such as videotaping, editing, and marketing services; in
such a situation, it is very unlikely that the institution will be
regarded as having contributed the kind of “authorship” that is
necessary for a “joint work” that automatically entitles it to a share in
the copyright ownership. On the other hand, the institution may,
through its administrators and staff, effectively determine or
contribute to such detailed matters as substantive coverage, creative
graphic elements, and the like; in such a situation, the institution has
303
a stronger claim to co-ownership rights.

This is a very different approach. At some universities, the
dividing point is the amount of additional resources the faculty
member uses for the project. The faculty member loses his
ownership rights because he has used additional university
resources; thereby, under a work-for-hire scenario, the
university reclaims ownership. This is problematic as the
university, in disclaiming ownership, must make that
assignment in writing. Instead, the AAUP turns the burden
back to the university, to show that the university has

299. Id. Another situation is a work specifically commissioned in writing
and falling outside “the normal scope of [a] person’s employment duties.” Id.
Thus the nine enumerated categories of commissioned works, an area often
overlooked in the discussion of faculty/university ownership. See id. The third
situation is described as contractual transfers, where, like in the Arizona
Regent’s IP policy, the work is connected to an outside sponsor and licensing
arrangements have been made. See id. The statement adds, “Similarly, the
college or university may reasonably request that the faculty member—when
entering into an agreement granting the copyright or publishing rights to a
third party—make efforts to reserve to the institution the right to use the
work in its internally administered programs of teaching, research, and public
service on a perpetual, royalty-free, nonexclusive basis.” Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. See also 17 U.S.C. § 101.
302. AAUP, Statement on Copyright, supra note 266.
303. Id.
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contributed enough authorship to be included as a joint author.
At no time does the faculty member lose the ownership of his
syllabi, lecture notes, or other materials because they have
been put into a new form requiring additional resources from
the university.
Alternatively, a university might be
“compensated with royalties commensurate with its
investment” or be given “some sort of implied royalty-free
304
‘license to use’ the copyrighted work.”
The statement ends with a list of items a faculty member
may do, in the event that the university does claim ownership,
either in a traditional or more technological setting:
Conversely, where the institution holds all or part of the copyright,
the faculty member should, at a minimum, retain the right to take
credit for creative contributions, to reproduce the work for his or her
instructional purposes, and to incorporate the work in future
scholarly works authored by that faculty member. In the context of
distance-education courseware, the faculty member should also be
given rights in connection with its future uses, not only through
compensation but also through the right of “first refusal” in making
the new version or at least the right to be consulted in good faith on
305
reuse and revisions.

F. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA COPYRIGHT TASKFORCE
In the last several decades, universities have become
increasingly linked to commercial, governmental, and
civil organizations and authorities.
As a result,
universities are directly affected by the growing
commercialization of copyrighted and copyrightable
works. At the same time digital technologies are making
possible the creation of new genres of works never before
imagined. . .
Introduction, in UC, Universitywide Taskforce on
306
Copyright
While the UC copyright policy has not changed since 1992,
a Copyright Task Force was developed for the UC system, with
the committee meeting from November 1997 to April 1998,
“working in parallel with the Library Planning and Action
307
In the introduction to Universitywide
Initiative Task Force.”

304. Id.
305. Id.
306. UC Taskforce on Copyright, supra note 29.
307. Id at “Copyright Task Force.” The copyright task force included
Michael Tanner, Chair; Peter Berck; John Canny; Mary Corey (by phone);
Suzanne Henry; Richard Lucier; Mark Rose; Pamela Samuelson; Kevin Smith;
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Task Force on Copyright: Report and Recommendations, the
executive summary asserts, “The University should reaffirm
the policy that a faculty member owns his or her scholarly and
308
aesthetic works.” The report advocates that the University of
California “clarify its commitment to this tradition and
reassure those who fear that it may lay claim to individual
309
In “Ownership, Partnership,
faculty works of authorship.”
and Management,” the Report explains that “[t]he University
and its faculty are partners in the academic mission of creating
310
The report continues:
and disseminating knowledge.”
“However, the Task Force urges a wide ranging discussion of
the opportunities that might occasionally make voluntary
311
The report gives one
departures from this norm desirable.”
factual scenario and two hypotheticals. The factual scenario
concerns the digital recording of faculty lectures, and the
unauthorized selling of the recording to third parties. The
question arises whether the faculty or the university owns the
lecture, creating a further responsibility to sue for
infringement. The second scenario concerns the fear that
administrators are claiming ownership to syllabi and course
materials in order to create and sell courseware packages in a
commercial setting, “without the permission or participation of
312
The third
the faculty member who created the course.”
scenario reverses the second, with the administrators fearing
that faculty members will package and sell their own syllabi
313
The Task Force believes all three
and course material.
scenarios are unacceptable and, like the AAUP, that
314
They do not
partnerships and alternatives must be formed.

Corynne McSherry (graduate student researcher); Martha Winnacker, Jeffrey
Cole; Stuart Lynn; and Irwin Sherman. Draft University of California Task
Force
on
Copyright
Meeting,
January
26,
1998,
Minutes,
http://www.ucop.edu/acadinit/copyright/minutes/min012698.html (last visited
Sept. 1, 2002).
308. UC Taskforce on Copyright, supra note 29 at “Executive Summary.”
309. Id. at 5.
310. Id. at 11.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 12. See also David F. Noble, Digital Diploma Mills: The
Automation of Higher Education,” Oct. 1997, at
http://www.uwo.ca/uwofa/articles/noble.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2002), where
he examines the current secret deals created at UCLA extension.
313. UC Taskforce on Copyright, supra note 29, at 14. This is similar to
the Arthur Miller example at Harvard University, where Harvard protested
Miller filming lectures for an online law school.
314. Id.
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recommend a blanket policy, but suggest “short term case-bycase contracts to experiment with the consequences of differing
allocation of rights. Contracts could, for example, make
available instructional development or media resources in
exchange for vesting all or part of copyright rights in the
315
institution.” This statement seems to suggest that additional
resources might prompt a copyright contract with an
institution, with the faculty-author then negotiating, perhaps
for the right to make derivative rights, or the right to continue
using the material after moving to a different university. It
also implies that the university would not claim the work under
a work-for-hire doctrine, but would negotiate a joint authorship
or assignment of copyright from the faculty-author. The report
reiterates that while it will take time to experiment, “UC
should relieve anxiety by asserting that it will protect both
institutional and individual interests related to classroom
lectures and recorded collaborative works by faculty and
316
students.”
The executive summary also recommends that “UC should
provide copyright education and services on every campus,” and
would include both education on how to comply with copyright
laws when using others’ materials, as well as “how to exercise
the rights of copyright owners in ways that promote the
317
The executive summary
dissemination of knowledge.”
continues: “Such information should include case studies and
model contracts that demonstrate how collaborative works and
assignment of copyrights to third parties may be managed to
protect the integrity of works and ensure that they are freely
318
accessible for teaching and research.”
The Introduction immediately addresses the concern that
ownership is linked to continued creative and scholarly works,
but also notes that without clear ownership, commercial
319
The report also notes that
ventures also cannot go forward.
previously the UC system had a central Copyright, Patent and
Trademark office, but today “there is no systematic support for
management of or education about such copyrightable works as

315. Id. at 14.
316. Id.
The report also points to the 1995 Workgroup on the
Commercialization of Lecture Materials for notes regarding the allocation of
rights for lectures.
317. Id at “Executive Summary,” No. 5.
318. Id.
319. Id. at “Introduction.”
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scholarly writing, creative works of art and music, and
multimedia course materials,” which the report hopes the
320
university rectifies.
The report notes two different approaches. A University of
Kansas draft policy has taken a different approach, claiming
ownership on “mediated courseware,” arguing that they are
created and offered with substantial investment of university
resources and that the university must be able to use them
again. Additional compensation is given to faculty if the
courseware is used by a different faculty member, and the
author/faculty member is given the right to create derivative
works, and “retains the right to transfer institutional rights to
321
Stanford has a more extreme response,
third parties.”
322
claiming ownership “of all Stanford course materials.”
In
contrast, the report suggests that a myriad of ownership
scenarios may exist in a multimedia setting where there are
multiple authors and collaboration, including “joint authorship,
assignment of rights to a single owner, and University
323
With regard to when the university should own
ownership.”
a work, the report suggests first that “the University should
develop a mechanism for evaluating when an investment of
University resources will encourage the creation of works that
324
will enhance the academic mission.”
G. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
Columbia University’s copyright policy may serve as a
model for thoroughness. Columbia University makes the same
allowances as the University of Arizona of granting ownership
in traditional materials, but Columbia also clearly states that
the form of the traditional materials will not alter ownership
allocation: “By longstanding custom, faculty members hold
copyright for books, monographs, articles, and similar works as
delineated in the policy statement, whether distributed in print
or electronically. This pattern will not change. This copyright

320. Id. at 4.
See also the University of Kansas policy at
321. Id. at n. 12.
http://www.ukans.edu/~kbor/ipdraft.html.
322. UC Taskforce on Copyright, supra note 29, at n 12. See also Stanford’s
Copyright Policy at http://www.stanford.edu/dept/DoR/rph/5-2.html (last
updated Dec. 22, 1998); see also, Patent and Copyright Agreement for Stanford
Personnel, at http://www.stanford.edu/dept/DoR/rph/su18.html, (last visited
Sept. 14, 2002).
323. UC Taskforce on Copyright, supra note 29, at 11.
324. Id. at 15.
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325

policy retains and reasserts those rights.”
As noted above,
this was not the case with the University of Arizona, where
electronic forms were to be decided on a case-by-case basis.
Similar to the University of Arizona,
Columbia will hold rights in copyright to works of authorship that are
created at the University by faculty, research staff, and others and
that are supported by a direct allocation of University funds, are
commissioned by the University, make substantial use of financial or
logistical support from the University beyond the level of common
resources provided to faculty, or are otherwise subject to contractual
326
obligations.

The Columbia policy also acknowledges that faculty may
distribute their copyrighted works without permission as long
as the work is not courseware or course content, action the
Consortium seems to discourage. Courseware and course
content may be distributed for non-commercial use “to
recipients who agree that they will not make commercial use of
327
the material.” In each instance, the University does not want
its name attached, except to identify the faculty member as an
instructor at the University. The copyright policy devotes a
328
Using the
special section to course content and courseware.

325. Columbia University, Preamble to the Columbia University Copyright
Policy, http://columbia.edu/cu/provost/docs/copyright.html (last visited Sept. 1,
2002) [hereinafter Preamble to the Columbia University Copyright Policy]. See
also, Columbia University, Columbia University Copyright Policy, Section 1.
Copyright Ownership; Assertion of Rights, A. Traditional Faculty Authorship
Rights, at http://www.columbia.edu/cu/provost/docs/copyright.html (last visited
Sept 1, 2002) [hereinafter Columbia University Copyright Policy]. Columbia
uses the language “disseminated” rather than “created in print or
electronically.” See id. In contrast to other policies, this is where the focus
belongs, as in copyright the form of the creation does not create a new or
additional copyright, but the creative elements in the tangible form do.
326. Preamble to the Columbia University Copyright Policy, supra note 325.
See also, Columbia University Copyright Policy, supra note 325, at Section 1.
Copyright Ownership; Assertion of Rights, B. Assertion of Rights by the
University. Categories in the Columbia policy correspond to those of
University of Arizona and other universities – additional funds above the
normal usage, sponsored projects, administrative works, or created or
commissioned specifically by the University. The policy explicitly notes that
“ordinary use of resources such as the libraries, one’s office, desktop computer
and University computer infrastructure, secretarial staff and supplies, is not
considered to be substantial use of such resources for purposes of vesting the
University with copyright ownership in a work.” Id.
327. Columbia University Copyright Policy, supra note 325, at Section 1.
Copyright Ownership; Assertion of Rights, D. Non-commercial Distribution of
Creator-owned Works.
328. Columbia University Copyright Policy, supra note 325, at Section 1.
Copyright Ownership; Assertion of Rights, E. Categories of Works, No. 2.
Course Content and Courseware. Courseware is defined as “the set of tools
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principle distinction of faculty versus university ownership, the
section aggressively asserts that the University will claim its
rights to copyright in course content and may “limit the faculty
member’s ability unilaterally to commercialize non329
The university
institutional course content and courseware.”
will also claim ownership in videotapes of lectures (the object
themselves) but not the underlying copyrighted work, which
would be governed by the faculty/university ownership
330
The policy does create another category,
distinction above.
“institutional courses” that the university would own, but the
policy does not define them further. Faculty may participate in
course creation outside of the university, as long as these
endeavors do not include “commercialization of any course
content.” In fact, any commercialized project must be approved
“by the appropriate dean and the Provost” in advance. This
last point is sticky, because if a faculty member owns the
copyright to their lectures, and other materials produced
without additional substantial resources from the university,
that faculty member retains the right to make derivative
works, distribute and publicly perform. Does this mean that
the faculty is being assigned only part of the rights of
copyright? How does this work in a legal context?
H. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS
Georgia Harper, a copyright attorney at the University of
Texas at Austin has developed a great deal of material on
university intellectual property policies and has become a
leader in educating universities and scholars on IP issues.
Given that the courts are split on whether the “teacher
exception” exists, she believes it would be unwise to depend
331
She suggests that
upon that for ownership rights.
teachers/educators do fall under the employee/employer
relationship, but that one must look to the particular

and technologies used to present course content, and is independent of the
content itself.” Id. Course content is defined as “the intellectual content of the
course, as taught at or through the University.” Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. See Georgia Harper, Copyright Law in Cyberspace, Office of General
Counsel, University of Texas System, at
http://www.utsystem.edu/OGC/IntellectualProperty/distance.htm, (last visited
Sept. 1, 2002). Look in particular at section entitled, “Ownership in Detail:
The Employer is the Owner When,” where in reference to the “teacher
exception” she writes, “reliance is not recommended.”

2003]

DISAPPEARING TEACHER EXCEPTION

271
332

university’s intellectual property for further guidance.
She
noted that when determining ownership of joint authors at
different universities it would be necessary to determine the
intellectual properties for each author to make that
333
determination.
Harper has created what she calls a comprehensive
copyright policy that addresses both using copyrighted works
334
She notes that in the
and the creation of copyrighted works.
past, with regard to managing and licensing new creations,
institutions “haven’t taken them or their value very
335
She states that it “is up to us as institutions and
seriously.”
as an educational community. These are our works, made by
336
us for us.”
For the UT system, faculty own “scholarly, artistic,
literary, musical and educational materials within the author’s
337
field of expertise.” One wonders why the addition of “author’s
field of expertise,” how a “field of expertise” is defined, and
what happens if a scholar writes outside of the field s/he has
been hired to teach. Then, a more curious statement is made,
“[i]f the University wants to use such a work, to recover
expenses of its creation and/or share in royalties if the work is
commercialized, it should establish standard University rights
that apply to such works or negotiate its rights in a contract
338
What expenses are they talking
with the faculty author.”
about—salary and regular expenses? Extra expenses? And in
what context will the contract be negotiated?
The policy also exemplifies how traditional spaces
transformed into electronic forms sometimes create new
ownership rights, stating “[s]cholarly works owned by faculty
members can be implemented in software, which is usually
339
The
identified as an invention and owned by the Board.”

332. See id.
333. See id.
334. The U. T. System Comprehensive Copyright Policy, at
http://www.utsystem.edu/ogc/intellectualproperty/cprtpol.htm (last visited
Sept. 15, 2002).
335. See id.
336. Id.
337. University of Texas, Who Owns What, at
http://www.utsystem.edu/ogc/intellectualproperty/whowns.htm (last visited
Sept. 15, 2002).
338. Id.
339. Id. The page gives three additional policies to look at: the Intellectual
Property Policy Section 2.32, Administrative Software Policy, and the
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taping of lectures is dealt with in the Administrative Policy Regarding Creation, Use and Distribution of Telecourse
340
Materials.
Here, “[f]aculty members . . . hold copyright in
Telecourse materials they create on their own initiative in the
341
course of the performance of their teaching responsibilities.”
Thus, Telecourses created by non-faculty and within the scope
of their employment are owned by the Board.
Telecourses created by faculty members as a condition of their
employment fall into the category of works for hire or works created
by an employee within the scope of employment; thus, copyright in
such works is owned by the Board. Telecourses created jointly by
faculty authors and others whose contributions would be works for
hire will be jointly owned by the faculty author and the Board. Any
owner of copyright in a Telecourse may secure copyright registration;
joint owners may, but do not have to, agree to bear responsibility for
342
enforcement of the copyright.
343

This is one of the first policies to discuss registration.
Faculty “should” retain revision rights in the materials they
344
create, by specific terms in a contract. The policy explains:
Regardless of who owns copyright in Telecourse materials, faculty
who participate will undoubtedly wish to retain some control over the
later use of the materials. Faculty will be reluctant to memorialize
lectures and other educational materials if they are unable to update,
revise or eliminate entirely parts of the work that are no longer


Administrative Distance Learning Policy. Here is the substance of the IP
policy:
2.3 The Board shall assert its interest in scholarly or educational
materials, art works, musical compositions and dramatic and
nondramatic literary works related to the author’s academic or
professional field, regardless of the medium of expression, as follows:
2.31 Students, professionals, faculty and researcher authors.—The
Board shall not assert ownership of works covered by this Subsection
authored by students, professionals, faculty, and nonfaculty
researchers. The Board encourages these authors to carefully manage
their copyrights. The Board retains certain rights in these works as
set forth in the Policy and Guidelines for Management and Marketing
of Copyrighted Works.
2.32 Software.—The Board normally shall assert ownership in
software as an invention; however, original software which is content
covered by Subdivision 2.31, or that is integral to the presentation of
such content, shall be owned in accordance with Subdivision 2.31.
Id.
340. See University of Texas, Administrative Policy, Regarding Creation,
Use and Distribution of Telecourse Materials, at
http://www.utsystem.edu/ogc/intellectualproperty/telecrs.htm (last visited
September 15, 2002).
341. See id.
342. Id.
343. See id.
344. See id.
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relevant, correct, or are merely no longer timely. Since the Copyright
Law would not vest the right to revise, edit or even destroy a work
belonging to another, these rights must be granted in contracts
between any component and its faculty members who will be
exercising the rights. Further, since the application of the work for
hire provisions of Copyright Law does not always bring about the
allocation of ownership of copyright that the parties may have
intended, it is important to have a contract to properly address
ownership issues as well. The contract should include a statement
that the work is a work for hire, an assignment of copyright to be sure
that the intended result is realized, and special provisions allowing
the faculty member to retain a right to edit or modify the original at
specified times, thus creating a derivative work. A sample contract is
attached as Attachment B. If this form of agreement is utilized
without substantive alteration, it should not require review by the
345
Office of General Counsel.

With regard to royalties, the owner takes all—whether it is
a faculty member creating on their own initiative or the Board
346
The University will also require
as part of a faculty’s duties.
the faculty to share royalties in traditional scholarly material
when the faculty has used substantial resources at the
university, where otherwise all royalties on traditional
347
materials, regardless of form, belong to the faculty.
The UT site is a great resource. One page, in particular,
helps navigate through determining ownership rights
348
The page lets the
connected with the creation of courseware.
user click the answers to three categories: “Who provided the
initial impetus to create the Work?,” “Who will contribute
copyrightable expression?,” and whether the faculty will elect
349
The
to have the work fall under the scope of employment.
last question, it is explained, is that
some faculty authors may not wish to own their works, because they
consider themselves to be employees working within the scope of their
employment. In such a case, the faculty member need only sign an
acknowledgement of this unusual circumstance. This election shifts
ownership of the affected contribution to the University and causes
350
the standard rules for liability for infringement to control.

The site also provides sample courseware contracts for

345. Id.
346. See id.
347. See id.
348. See University of Texas, Courseware Contracts - Starting with the
Right Contract, at
http://www.utsystem.edu/ogc/intellectualproperty/course.htm
(last
visited
September 15, 2002).
349. See id.
350. Id.
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“Faculty Sole Owners,” “Joint Owners,” “Work-For-Hire,”
“TeleCampus Funded Faculty Owned Contribution to a
Collective Work,” and “TeleCampus Funded Joint Creation and
351
Ownership Agreement.”
V. SOME PRACTICAL THOUGHTS
Some universities may appear to see copyright as mere
economics, in that they do not want to give away their potential
pots of gold. But more is at stake, both for the university and
the creators. Universities have greater obligations beyond
economics, including the dissemination of information to the
public. Many of the steps now being taken are influenced not
only by the cultural impact of the Bayh-Dole Act, which allowed
federally-funded research to be patented by universities, but
also by increased amounts of commercial profit from
trademarks and economic potential in copyrighted works.
A. LEGAL QUESTIONS SURROUNDING UNCERTAIN COPYRIGHT
OWNERSHIP
Those creating copyright works must fully understand the
implications of the policies, so as not to live in fear, confusion or
misplaced concern. For those interested in copyright and the
use of these creations, it is obvious that serious issues remain.
The following portion of this article will identify four of them.
1. Ownership as Duration of Copyright. The length of
copyright is dependent, in part, on whether the work is a workfor-hire or created by an individual. If the work is a work-forhire, the duration of copyright is 120 years from creation or 95
352
If the work is
years from publication, whichever is shorter.
created by an individual, the current term is life of the author
353
Complete chaos results from the federal
plus 70 years.
statute’s failure to specify who owns the work, leaving
ownership to individual university policies. What happens
when scholars want to use these works in twenty, fifty, or a
hundred years? Who will they turn to for permission, or to
determine whether the work is in the public domain? Few
people are concerned about this, since they see most of the
work as relevant for only a semester or a few years. In fact,
many professors use lectures throughout a career, and far from

351. See id.
352. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (c).
353. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (a).
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being disposable, these lectures form part of their lifetime body
of work. Uncertain ownership is very troubling, as ownership
gives the owner certain rights for a certain period of time.
Without certainty now, a great deal of chaos will emerge in the
future.
2. Registration. Are these works being registered? How
are these works being registered at the Copyright Office?
Again, the copyright holder must be identified. Is this based on
university policy? Tradition? If a university claims ownership
to the material, are they then responsible for registering it as
well? As we saw in Part II of this article, with registration
comes statutory damages and potential attorney’s fees in a
successful infringement suit. Moreover, if infringement occurs,
is the university willing to sue if a creator brings this to their
attention? Does university ownership give the creator more
support to protect their works from others? The University of
354
Texas is one of the few universities addressing this question.
3. Original versus Derivative work. The copyright owner
authorizes derivative works. If ownership is unclear, who does
the authorizing? Can a professor, after creating a website for a
class, write an article using the same materials? Must
professors gain permission from the university to make
derivative works because they were produced in a form in
which the university has claimed an ownership interest? Some
policies address this concern, but many do not.
4. The University’s Responsibilities. With ownership
comes responsibility.
As mentioned before, registration
becomes a question, as does dissemination, promotion, and
prosecuting unlawful infringers. Will the university create
Copyright Offices like they have created Technology Transfer
offices for patents and Licensing Offices for trademarks, in
order to help facilitate creators getting their products into
commercially-advantageous situations? David Perry, in the
Technology Transfer Office at University of Arizona, noted that
the university disclaims ownership of patents when the
technology transfer office determines the invention does not
355
Instead of spending $10,000 or
have economic potential.
more on the patent application process, the university releases

354. See University of Texas, Copyright Registration for Faculty Authored
Works, http://www.utsystem.edu/ogc/intellectualproperty/faccprt.htm (last
visited September 15, 2002).
355. Interview with David Perry, Office of Technology Transfer, University
of Arizona, (April 2001).
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the invention of the item to the inventor.
In case of later
success, the university has a built-in contractual mechanism
357
Could the
that allows the university to share the profits.
university put in place the same sort of policy with textbooks,
articles, and other traditional materials with copyright? With
patents, the university spends money as part of their
ownership responsibilities. With copyright, the university need
not spend, because copyright affixes at the moment of
358
At most, the university might pay a $30
creation.
registration fee, but the university typically does not do even
this. The University of California recognizes this need, with
the task force recommending the creation of a University
359
Copyright Office.
B. SURVIVING UNCERTAIN TIMES - THOUGHTS FOR THE
SCHOLARS
This article has looked at the increasing commercialization
of the university, the change in the copyright law, and how that
has impacted the view of the “teacher exception” and ownership
360
The article has also looked at
of materials within education.
specific intellectual property policies in the university as
examples of what is currently happening. While there are no
definitive answers, the trend seems to indicate that more
intellectual property policies in education dictate ownership,
rather than case law or statute carving out a special “teacher
exception.” Teachers, scholars, and researchers must look to
their institutions to determine who owns the materials being
created and under what circumstances. The following offers
some practical points to take away from this paper on how to
determine ownership of newly created materials.
th
1. Easterbrook versus Posner. Easterbrook’s 7 circuit
decision in Weinstein has, so far, brought the “teacher
361
Until courts
exception” into the realm of university policies.
decide otherwise, Posner’s dicta in Hayes that a teacher

356. See id.
357. See id.
358. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (a).
359. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
360. For another overview, see also Dan L. Burk, Ownership of Electronic
Materials in Higher Education, CAUSE/EFFECT, Vol. 20, no. 3, Fall, 1997, 1318, at http:// www.educause.edu/ir/library/html/cem9734.html (last visited
Sept 1, 2002).
361. See Weinstein v. Univ. of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1987).
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exception survives outside of university policy, as a judge-made
362
doctrine, seems outdated.
However, the point has yet to be
decided by any court after the Reid case and remains
363
uncertain.
2. Read All IP policies carefully. As this paper has
demonstrated, there are many subtle differences in the IP
policies at colleges and universities. Read these policies
carefully, and consider consulting with the university attorney
for clarification (remaining mindful of the attorney’s
professional obligation to the client university). Some policies
claim ownership in all works, but disclaim ownership on more
traditional works. Many claim ownership when a significant
amount of recourses are used.
Some require copyright
assignment if the project has commercial potential. Others
make the university a joint author. Some give certain rights to
faculty members, and keep other parts of the copyright for
themselves. Also, make sure to read not merely the IP policy,
but any additional policies connected to the IP policy, such as
those on distance learning.
3. Claiming ownership in traditional materials before
creating derivative works. Because many universities still
disclaim ownership or allow faculty ownership of traditional
materials (textbooks, lectures, and other non-digital, nonelectronic forms of scholarly materials), register copyrighted
364
then make a derivative work
work at the Copyright Office,
365
for digital, distance learning, or multimedia projects.
If
problems arise later, registration establishes prima facie
366
The scholar will
evidence of the ownership of the original.
then own the underlying original work, regardless of whether

362. See Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988).
363. See Cmty. For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid 109. S. Ct. 2166 (1989).
364. See Kenneth Crews, COPYRIGHT LAW AND GRADUATE RESEARCH: NEW
MEDIA, NEW RIGHTS, AND YOUR DISSERTATION, (Proquest Information and
Learning, 2000), at http://www.umi.com/hp/Support/DExplorer/copyrght/ (last
visited September 15, 2002) (manual providing a roadmap for copyright
compliance).
365. See Copyright Office Website, at http://www.copyright.gov (last visited
February 12, 2003).
366. It also guarantees statutory damages (without having to prove actual
damages) and perhaps attorney’s fees, if infringement on the original is found.
See 17 U.S.C. § 412; § 505. To do this, a scholar should go to the Copyright
Office’s web site at http://www.copyright.gov. Make sure to use the proper
form. The Copyright Office has information on the web site on which form
applies and how to fill the form in. The process is not difficult, but make sure
to follow directions.
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the university claims ownership in subsequent works. Both
published and unpublished works may be registered with the
367
Copyright Office.
The university, in that case, will only own
materials “added” to the original work, and not the original
work itself. This means that the scholar can revise the original
work, create new derivative works, and do all of the other
things a copyright owner is allowed to do.
a. Copyright Registration. An individual can easily
368
register a copyright with the Copyright Office.
This may be
done with each individual creation ($30 each) or as a collection
369
However, if an infringement occurs,
($30 for the collection).
statutory damages only apply to the materials in the collection,
and not the individual pieces; that is, if it is registered in a
collection, statutory damages may be awarded only once for the
collection, rather than on each piece. That aside, once the
original work is copyrighted (and registered), the owner may
create derivative works.
For example, the copyright
holder/scholar could use additional university resources to
create a new project, with the original project as the core
content of the work. The university might claim ownership on
the new product, for example, the CD-ROM or the website, but
the scholar would still own the original work within the new
medium.
The new university-owned work would be a
derivative of the original work. The same applies to lecture
materials. If an author valued ownership, s/he could record
lectures, provide copies of course materials and anything else
370
created, and again register them with the Copyright Office.
Then, if the university wanted the course to be in an online
version, s/he would license the right to create an online version

367. See Copyright Office Website, at http://www.copyright.gov (last visited
February 12, 2003).
368. Directions are given on the Copyright Office’s website:
http://www.copyright.gov. Registration includes filing out the proper form
(downloadable from the site), and sending two copies of the work, along with
$30 per registration. See id.
369. Copyright Office, Fees, at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/fees.html
(last visited April 20, 2001).
370. Penne Restad, a lecturer at University of Texas, did just that
[recorded her own lectures], according to reporter Sharon Jayson in Online
Notes Debate; College Lecturers spilt over propriety of free, AMERICAN-AUSTIN
STATESMAN, March 26, 2000 at Metro/State B1, in order to combat a
professional, commercial notetaker hidden amongst her 400 students. Georgia
Harper also recommends this at University of Texas. See University of Texas,
Ownership of Lectures, at
www.utsystem.edu/ogc/intellectualproperty/lectures.htm. (last visited
September 15, 2002).
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to the university. Alternatively, s/he could assign a derivative
right to make an online version. However, s/he would retain
371
ownership of the underlying materials.
b. Specific student concerns. If ownership is important to
a student, the student might think about how s/he is “paid” for
particular work. If a student is getting academic credit for a
creation, the student will own the creation, unless the work is
collaborative. When the student does research for credit for a
professor, there is an implied right for the professor to use the
materials, but the student has kept the copyright in the notes
and writings. If, however, the student is paid for these same
activities, the situation is more complicated. This may be
considered an employee/employer relationship, depending on
school policy. However, it may not fit within the categories of
the Reid test. Just because a work is labeled as a work-for-hire
does not mean it is a work-for-hire. It must satisfy the factors
of the Reid test. Then the university, and not the professor for
372
whom the research was done, owns the notes and materials.
4. A Special note regarding web sites. This is an area in
flux. At some schools, web sites are not part of required job
tasks, and if created by the professor, will be the property of
the professor. If the web site is created using the labor and
more than usual amounts of resources at the university, the
university may claim ownership. At the University of Arizona,
the IP policy states that it will decide ownership on a case-bycase basis on all electronic materials, which means in practical

371. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 71, § 5.03[B][1][b][i] n.92
(citing Siegel v. Nat’l Periodical Pubs., Inc., 508 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1974)
(earlier version of Superman created prior to commencement of employment
relationship held not owned by employer) and Scerr v. Universal Match Corp.,
417 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 936 (1970) (interpreting the
Siegel case as holding that “[t]he first expression of the Superman character
was the underlying work, and the later development of the character was a
derivative work. Because only the derivative work was produced in a for-hire
relationship, the underlying work remains the property of the creators, absent
an assignment thereof.”)).
372. Indiana University has research assistants sign a copyright
agreement, which includes, inter alia,
that any copyrightable works that I may create within the scope of my
service as a research assistant shall be regarded as “works made for
hire” under the U.S. Copyright Act. Should any such works not
qualify as works made for hire, I hereby assign or transfer any
copyright interest that I may have in and to such works to Indiana
University or to my instructor as may be appropriate of reach work.
Sample Agreement, Research Assistant Copyright Agreement, Indiana
at
University,
http://iupui.ed/~copyinfo/raagreemt.html
(last
visited
September 15, 2002).
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terms that they may claim ownership if an electronic medium
becomes economically profitable. For those fearful of the
university gaining control of a web site a number of law review
articles suggest that faculty not put their materials directly
onto university servers, but put their work on a separate web
373
That
site, which would then link to their university address.
way, once the link is removed, the instructor’s work is still
within their possession, and the university will have no copy of
the work. This might be particularly advantageous to adjuncts
and graduate students, who are not permanent faculty
members.
5. The Technology Transfer Office is not all bad.
Ownership is not the only game in town. A technology transfer
office may provide the resources to make the copyrighted work
turn a profit. In many cases, they distribute royalties both to
the instructor as well as the department. If the instructor is
thinking about a collaborative project that would involve the
university, it may turn out to be a very happy experience, and
the instructor may become, the hero of the department with the
royalties streaming in. In this way, it goes to the CETUS’s idea
of unbundling the rights to serve all of the interests involved.
6. Reorienting One’s World View. The days of scholars
locked away from the commercial/business/corporate world are
quickly fading. Scholars must think about the materials they
create, as well as those they use within a more commercialized
environment. Otherwise instructors may find themselves
colonized and enslaved, providing the raw cultural resources
for both the university and multi-national corporations.
Practical steps are needed, and faculties’ voices must ring out
as copyright policies – nationally and in the universities –
reorient the game to heightened commercialization of creations.
Scholars must be aware of the discourses of the laws, customs,

373. See e.g., Holmes and Levin, supra note 1 at 188-9. After writing a law
review article in which they argue that the “teacher exception” still applies
today, the authors advocate in their conclusion that
[f]aculty wishing to preserve ownership rights in copyrightable
materials they develop would seem to have a stronger argument in
favor of ownership if they require “passwords” or other limiting
devices to screen access to the materials. Faculty might also want to
consider posting the materials with private service providers rather
than with school or university providers so as to protect their copyright
under the 1976 Copyright Act and the DMCA.
Id. (emphasis added). Note that the authors do not give any reason for this at
all, and give no footnotes or citations as to why they believe this. See id. This
is how they end their article that is pro-”teacher exception.”
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and concerns of the commerical world. Much negotation,
discussion and molding of policy, vision, and values can be
accomplished. Scholars must take the discourse theories of
their academic work and apply them to their academic world.
Commercialization of the univeristy is not necessarily an evil.
But scholars should actively engage in the conversation,
articulating their own views and thoughts, rather than
allowing the corporate world to dictate the hegemony of the
new century.
7. Policy versus Practice. Scholars should be aware of the
policies and the laws governing their works, but also recognize
that within the university some policies are followed, while
others are not fully enforced. Some universities may follow a
“don’t ask, don’t tell” policy. If they do not know about a
project, they do not actively seek to find out; yet, if they find
out, they must pursue ownership issues. A good rule of thumb
appears to be that if the work has actual or potential economic
worth, the university will be interested in claiming ownership.
Even with patents, if the university does not see it as
economically advantageous, they will give the ownership back
to the inventor. One should be aware of what the practices are,
and not merely consider the policies.
8. The Role of Contracts. A number of scholars, like Todd
Borow and Ashley Packard, place emphasis on the employment
contract or specific contracts between the faculty member and
the university, rather than case-law or even university policies
374
Both Packard and Borow suggest scholars secure
alone.
copyright through contract, which expressly reserves rights
375
This would require scholars to
scholars feel are of concern.
have the power and clout to be able to do this. However,
Borow, Packard, and others suggest that they do not believe
the written requirement for assignment under the copyright act
376
Borow explains
is satisfied by a university copyright policy.
that “handbooks are unlikely to be considered signed writings
by courts,” and that both parties, not merely the faculty
377
This is an area to
member, must sign the express writing.
watch in the coming years. Packard agrees, writing, “[l]egally,

374. See Borow, supra note 170; Packard, supra note 49.
375. Borow, supra note 170, at 166-67; Packard, supra note 49, at 313-314.
376. Borow, supra note 170, at 166-67; Packard, supra note 49, at 313-314.
377. Borow, supra note 170, at 168 (citing Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The
Creative Employee and The Copyright Act of 1976, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 600
(1987)).
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there is some question as to whether a written university policy
‘satisfies the section 204(a) requirement of a writing signed by
the professor, or the section 201(b) requirement of a writing
378
signed by the professor and the university.’”
9. Demand help. Finally, scholars and educators need not
figure all of these issues out on their own. If the university will
assert ownership over materials, scholars need to ask in return
for help navigating through the minefields. At the same time,
scholars need to make sure it is not a one-way administrative
dialogue.
In conclusion, this Article suggests that all is not lost with
the “teacher exception.”
University policies are still
recognizing this tradition. Moreover, educators, like those that
gathered at the Pew Learning and Technology Program in
2000, seem to be continuing to advocate for a teacher exception
with a modified commercial-caveat. Carol Twigg in Who Owns
Online Courses and Course Materials? Intellectual Property
Policies for a New Learning Environment, summarized the
activities and findings of this conference of fourteen higher
education leaders, including Kenneth Crews and Georgia
379
The article presents
Harper, held in February 2000.

378. Packard, supra note 49, at 313-314.
379. Carol A. Twigg, The Pew Learning and Technology Program, Who
Owns Online Courses and Course Materials? Intellectual Property Policies for a
New Learning Environment, (2000), at
http://www.center.rpi.edu/PewSym/mono2.html (last visited February 12,
2003). The full list included: Barbara McFadden Allen, Director Committee on
Institutional Cooperation; Dan L. Burk, Professor of Law, University of
Minnesota Law School; Bruce Chaloux, Director, Southern Regional Electronic
Campus, Southern Regional Education Board; George Connick, President,
Distance Education Publications; Kenneth D. Crews, Director, Copyright
Management Center, and Associate Professor of Law, Indiana UniversityPurdue University Indianapolis; Russ Edgerton, Director, Pew Forum on
Undergraduate Learning, The Education Trust; William H. Graves, Chairman
and Founder Eduprise; Georgia K. Harper, Attorney/Section Manager—
Intellectual Property, University of Texas System; Isabella Hinds, Director of
Publisher Alliances, WebCT; Terence P. McElwee, Director, Technology
Transfer and Corporate Research, Marquette University; Gary Miller,
Associate Vice President, Continuing and Distance Education, Penn State
University; James Neal, Dean of University Libraries, The Johns Hopkins
University; Rodney J. Petersen, Director, OIT Policy and Planning, University
of Maryland; and Carol A. Twigg, Executive Director, Center for Academic
Transformation.
Virtual participants included: Robert K. Gemin, Vice
President and Publisher, Archipelago Productions, Robert C. Heterick, Jr.,
Former President, Educom; Sylvia Manning, Interim Chancellor, The
University of Illinois at Chicago; Christopher J. Rogers, Director of New
Business Development, and John Wiley and Sons, Inc.. Reporters included
Patricia Bartscherer, Program Manager, Center for Academic Transformation
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scenarios and policy concerns for institutions facing these
problems, including the possible creation of “academic” pop
stars through online courses, or competing commercial
interests in intellectual products created at the university, but
recognizes that most situations would not become so
380
In the end, her summation reiterates that the
commodified.
“law” is not settled, and that universities should think through
381
what they want and how they want to achieve their goals.
Twigg’s article suggests the following:
We recommend that the default policy position for all institutions
should be that the faculty member owns the course materials he or
she has created. Rather than trying to anticipate all the possible
exceptions and include them in a policy, institutions may want to
incorporate “trigger mechanisms” in the primary policy; these would
define specific situations or conditions that would trigger the
application of a second policy. As an example, if the course materials
are commercialized by someone other than the college or university
and actually make money, the institution could reserve the right to
get a certain percentage of royalties to recover any investment it may
382
have made. That percentage should be small, perhaps 5 percent.

In a way, these high-profile educators endorse the notion of
the continuation of the “teacher exception,” with the caveat
that the university would benefit economically (a percentage
scheme) from materials created that came to have a commercial
value. This is similar to universities whose policies transfer
ownership of patentable material to faculty when the
university does not have interest in pursing the patent, with
the caveat that if the patented work becomes profitable, the
university will still have stake (a percentage) in those profits.
How it will all turn out in the end, only time will tell.


and Susan Oaks, Assistant Professor and Area Coordinator, Communications,
Arts, and Humanities, SUNY Empire State College.
380. See id.
381. See id.
382. Id.

